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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued
242 precedential opinions. Of these, twenty-two were government
contract cases. This article discusses all twenty-two precedent-setting
opinions involving government contract law issues, setting forth the
relevant facts, the Federal Circuit’s analysis, and, where appropriate,
the ramifications of these cases. The decisions are grouped into the
following categories: jurisdiction, bid protests/preferences, contract
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formation, contract interpretation, contract performance/breach,
assignment of claims, damages, attorneys’ fees, and attorney
sanctions.
I.

JURISDICTION
1

A. Rick’s Mushroom Service, Inc., v. United States

In this appeal from an adverse U.S. Court of Federal Claims
(“COFC”) decision, Rick’s Mushroom Service, Inc. (“Rick’s”) sought
to establish that the Government was liable to pay for litigation and
rehabilitation costs associated with the clean-up of a spent mushroom
2
substrate (“SMS”) transfer site. The Federal Circuit affirmed the
COFC’s decision dismissing Rick’s claim for lack of subject matter
3
jurisdiction.
Rick’s predecessor signed a long-term cost-sharing agreement with
the National Resources Conservation Service (“NRCS”), a branch of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture charged with cooperating with
state and local soil and water conservation districts to carry out
improvements under the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention
4
Act. Under the terms of the agreement, Rick’s agreed to accept
technical assistance from the NRCS in operating its facility in
accordance with sound environmental practices, and the NRCS
agreed to share the costs with Rick’s of implementing those
5
practices.
In 2001, Rick’s neighbors, Warren and John Reynolds, and the
Wilmington Trust Company (collectively, “Reynolds”), filed suit
against Rick’s in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania alleging that it operated its SMS transfer facility in
6
violation of federal and state clean water laws. In 2004, the district
court issued a permanent injunction requiring Rick’s to obtain
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection permits as a
7
wastewater and solid waste facility. It found that Rick’s had failed to
comply with some of the operational requirements of the local
environmental management plan agreement and had caused the
8
contamination of the Reynolds’s property. After the district court
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

521 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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issued its order, Rick’s agreed to settle the case for $950,000. The
NRCS drafted a rehabilitation plan and a roof structure plan to help
10
eliminate some of the problems with waste discharge. It did not
indemnify Rick’s for its losses in litigation or pay for the new roof
11
structure.
Rick’s submitted a $5 million claim under the Contract Disputes
12
Act (“CDA”) to the contracting officer at NRCS. The “contracting
officer denied the claim, stating that because the contract was not a
procurement contract for goods or services, but rather a cooperative
13
agreement, the CDA was inapplicable.”
14
Rick’s filed suit in the COFC under three legal theories. In Count
I, Rick’s claimed it was entitled to recover its legal costs under a
theory of “equitable indemnification based on an implied-in-fact
15
16
warranty arising under the Spearin doctrine.” The COFC rejected
this first claim, concluding that it was precluded by the Anti17
Deficiency Act (“ADA”). In Count II, Rick’s asserted a breach of
18
contract claim. The COFC rejected this second claim because the
contract between Rick’s and NRCS was a cooperative agreement, not
a procurement contract; thus, no basis for jurisdiction existed under
19
the CDA. In Count III, Rick’s alleged a professional negligence
20
The COFC rejected this claim because it was a claim
claim.
21
sounding in tort. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack
22
of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s dismissal of Rick’s claim
23
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
It reasoned that the
jurisdictional reach of the COFC, as set forth in the Tucker Act, is
limited to claims “founded either upon the Constitution or any Act of
Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1341–42.
11. Id. at 1342.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) (awarding contractor
damages suffered from a flood caused by a sewer blockage omitted from the
contract’s specifications, where the contractor complied with all provisions of the
specifications).
16. Rick’s Mushroom, 521 F.3d at 1342 (citing Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 250, 254 (2007)).
17. Id. (citing Rick’s Mushroom, 76 Fed. Cl. at 261).
18. Id. (citing Rick’s Mushroom, 76 Fed. Cl. at 254).
19. Id. (citing Rick’s Mushroom, 76 Fed. Cl. at 258).
20. Id. (citing Rick’s Mushroom, 76 Fed. Cl. at 254).
21. Id. (citing Rick’s Mushroom, 76 Fed. Cl. at 256).
22. Id. (citing Rick’s Mushroom, 76 Fed. Cl. at 262).
23. Id. at 1344.
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express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
24
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” Accordingly, it
concluded that because the plain language excludes from COFC
jurisdiction claims sounding in tort, the COFC properly dismissed
25
Rick’s professional negligence claim.
In addressing Rick’s contract claim, the Federal Circuit observed
the well-established principles of federal contracting law that the
26
Tucker Act does not extend to every contract and that, to establish
jurisdiction in the COFC, “the plaintiff must look beyond the Tucker
Act to identify a substantive source of law that creates the right to
27
recovery of money damages against the United States.” It concluded
that Rick’s cost-share agreement with the Government did not
contain an express provision providing a substantive right to recover
money damages and that, notwithstanding Rick’s attempt to rely
upon the CDA, the CDA did not provide a substantive right to
28
recover money damages. The Federal Circuit found the COFC’s
reasoning that the cost-share agreement was not a procurement
29
contract to be persuasive. Furthermore, it found no basis to reexamine the COFC’s decision in light of the fact that Rick’s claim was
30
based, in part, upon an implied-in-fact contract. That Rick’s was
unable to identify a money-mandating provision under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1) or allege an implied-in-fact contract for procurement of
goods or services within the CDA proved to be fatal to Rick’s contract
31
claim.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Rick’s third argument that the
Government should be held liable for the costs Rick’s incurred in
defending the lawsuit against Reynolds because the cost-share
agreement, which detailed design specifications for the SMS transfer,
gave Rick’s an implied warranty that the transfer facility would be
32
adequate and the Government would be liable for any defects. The
Federal Circuit reasoned that, in order for Rick’s to establish that the
COFC possessed jurisdiction to entertain its breach of implied
warranty claim, it had to establish that the court possessed
33
jurisdiction over its cost-share agreement.
Since the COFC had
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 1343 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2006)).
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)).
Id. (citing Kania v. United States, F.2d 264, 268 (Ct. Cl. 1981)).
Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983)).
Id.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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already determined that it lacked jurisdiction over that agreement,
Rick’s was unable to establish that the COFC possessed jurisdiction to
34
entertain its breach of implied warranty claim. The Federal Circuit
concluded, furthermore, that the Spearin doctrine was inapplicable
because, even if the doctrine applied outside of the procurement
context, it applied only when the contract contains design
specifications, not performance specifications, such as those found in
35
Rick’s cost-sharing agreement.
The Federal Circuit concluded, furthermore, that Rick’s lawsuit
was barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hercules, Inc. v. United
36
States, which held that the company could not recover, from the
Government, costs it incurred in defending and settling Agent
Orange lawsuits brought by third parties because the ADA “would bar
37
such an open-ended indemnification agreement.”
The Federal
Circuit held that, “[b]ecause the contracting officer would have no
authority under the ADA to enter into an indemnity agreement
without an appropriation, we cannot find an implied-in-fact warranty
by the Government to indemnify Rick’s for its litigation costs in
38
defending against third party claims.”
The Federal Circuit rejected Rick’s claim that it was denied due
process, even though the Government had not raised the ADA issue
39
until the supplemental briefing stage.
It also rejected Rick’s
contention that the court improperly denied Rick’s discovery
40
regarding whether certain funds had been exhausted. The Federal
Circuit held that, because there had never been an appropriation for
indemnification of third-party claims, the COFC did not abuse its
discretion in disallowing discovery regarding whether the funds were
41
exhausted.
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Rick’s claim that the COFC
abused its discretion in declining to transfer its professional
42
negligence claim to the district court. The court reasoned that,
because Rick’s had never presented a written professional negligence
claim for money damages to the USDA, Rick’s had failed to satisfy the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 1344, 1345.
516 U.S. 417 (1996).
Rick’s Mushroom, 521 F.3d at 1345 (citing Hercules, 516 U.S. at 426–28).
Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id. at 1346–47.
Id. at 1347.
Id.

2009]

2008 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS

1057

exhaustion requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the Federal
43
Tort Claims Act.
44

B. Distributed Solutions, Inc., v. United States
45

In Distributed Solutions, Inc. v. United States, Distributed Solutions,
Inc. (“DSI”) and STR, L.L.C. (“STR”), appealed the dismissal of their
complaint by the COFC based upon their contention that the court
46
The
failed to interpret properly the basis of their complaint.
Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s decision, determining that the
court possessed jurisdiction to entertain DSI’s and STR’s complaint
because 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b) expressly permits the filing of protests of
pre-procurement decisions, such as an agency’s determination of a
47
need for property or services. The Federal Circuit remanded the
case to the COFC to determine whether the Government’s decision
to task SRA International, Inc. (“SRA”) to select the vendors who
would purchase software—instead of procuring the software through
48
a direct competitive process—was a violation of the statute.
The case arose “from a dispute related to the procurement of
software for the Joint Acquisition and Assistance Management System
program (“JAAMS”), a program initiated by the United States Agency
for International Development . . . and the Department of State . . .
to develop a common computer platform between the two
49
agencies.” The General Services Administration (“GSA”) awarded a
Millenia Government Wide Acquisition Contract to nine prime
contractors, including SRA, to provide technical services and support
50
In June 2005, the
for information technology purposes.
Government issued a Request for Information (“RFI”) soliciting
software vendors to provide a self-assessment of their products that
satisfied JAAMS requirements and to present product
demonstrations, which the RFI specified would be “‘for market
51
research purposes only’ and would ‘not result in a contract award.’”
The Government anticipated that it would “‘review the results of the
vendor self-assessments and the presentations to determine the next
52
course of action for the JAAMS effort.’”
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
539 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1343–44.
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1343–44, 1346.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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After its review was complete, the Government decided to pursue
another course of action, using SRA to integrate the various
53
acquisition and assistance functions necessary to implement JAAMS.
Therefore, under this plan, SRA was tasked with selecting the various
54
vendors needed to provide the necessary software. SRA issued an
RFI of its own, and, with approval from the Government, selected and
55
awarded subcontracts to various vendors. Although DSI and STR
both submitted and demonstrated software, they were not selected,
and, in response, they separately filed protests with the General
Accounting Office (“GAO”), which were dismissed because the
56
procurement was not subject to GAO jurisdiction.
57
DSI and STR consolidated their protest before the COFC. The
Government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction contending that the protest was not viable because the
58
award was a subcontract made by a contractor, not a Federal agency.
The COFC determined that the decision to task SRA with selecting
software vendors for JAAMS simply added to the work of an already
existing task order and that, “because SRA was not a purchasing
agent for the Government, the subcontracts awarded were not on
behalf of a federal agency and therefore were not subject to a bid
59
protest.” Accordingly, the COFC dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, DSI and STR argued that they were not contesting
SRA’s award of the software subcontracts, but rather the
Government’s decision to task SRA with awarding subcontracts for
60
the purchase of software. Section 1491(b) of title 28 establishes the
jurisdictional prerequisites for the COFC’s jurisdiction in bid protest
61
cases. Paragraph (1) of that subsection provides:
[T]he United States Court of Federal Claims . . . shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party
objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals
for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a
contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in
62
connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1342–43.
Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1343–44.
Id. at 1344 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1)).
Id. at 1344 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1)).
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The COFC determined that DSI and STR were interested parties
for the purpose of the statute and that they had alleged that the
Government violated sections of the Competition in Contracting
63
64
Act, the Small Business Act, and various Federal Acquisition
Regulations due to its decision to forego the direct competitive
procurement process and to task SRA with the responsibility of
65
indirectly selecting software vendors.
The only remaining issue was “whether the contractors’ protest
[was] ‘in connection with a procurement or a proposed
66
procurement’ under the scope of [§] 1491(b).” The Federal Circuit
concluded that there was no question that “‘the operative phrase ‘in
67
connection with’ is very sweeping in scope.’” The Federal Circuit
noted that Tucker Act did not define the terms “procurement” or
68
“proposed procurement.” Therefore, the Federal Circuit adopted
69
the definition of “procurement” found in 41 U.S.C. § 403(2) to
70
define those terms for the purposes of the Tucker Act. Based upon
this analysis, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]o establish
jurisdiction pursuant to this definition, the contractors must
demonstrate that the Government at least initiated a procurement, or
initiated ‘the process for determining a need’ for acquisition and
71
assistance solutions for JAAMS.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the trial court that adding work to
an existing contract that is within the scope of the contract is not a
72
basis for a protest under § 1491(b)(1). However, the Federal Circuit
distinguished this case from AT&T Communications, Inc. v. Wiltel,
73
Inc., noting that, to the extent that “the government used an RFI to
solicit information from outside vendors, and then used this
information to determine the scope of services required by the
government,” the COFC possesses jurisdiction to review these “preprocurement decisions by vesting jurisdiction in the [COFC] over
63. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3556 (2006); 41 U.S.C. §§ 253(a)–(b), 416, 418 (2006).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 631(j)(3) (2006).
65. Distributed Solutions, 539 F.3d at 1344–45.
66. Id. at 1345.
67. Id. (quoting RAM-COR Servs. Group, Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1286,
1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
68. Id.
69. Section 403(2) states that “‘procurement’ includes all stages of the process of
acquiring property or services, beginning with the process for determining a need for
property or services and ending with contract completion and closeout.” 41 U.S.C. §
403(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
70. Distributed Solutions, 539 F.3d at 1345 (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)).
71. Id. at 1346.
72. Id. (citing AT&T Commc’ns, Inc. v. Wiltel, Inc., 1 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir.
1993)).
73. 1 F.3d 1201.
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‘proposed procurements,’” which “begins with the process for
74
Given that the
determining a need for property or services.”
Government had conducted a proposed procurement, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the COFC erred in not exercising its
75
jurisdiction to entertain DSI’s and STR’s complaint.
76

C. Phillips/May Corp. v. United States
77

The appeal in Phillips/May Corp. v. United States stemmed from the
COFC’s determination that the claim of Phillips/May Corp.
78
(“Phillips”) was barred by res judicata. The COFC concluded that
the doctrine of claim preclusion prevented the court from
considering Phillips’s inspection claim for “Delay, Mal-Administration
of the Contract, Overzealous Inspection and Impossibility”
(“Inspection Claim”), because the claim was based upon the same
transactional facts as nine claims arising out of a contract for the
design, labor, materials, and equipment necessary to construct a
religious facility at the Naval Air Station-Joint Reserve Base (“NASJRB”) in Fort Worth, Texas that had been previously adjudicated by
79
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (“Board”).
Phillips submitted ten claims to the contracting officer at NAS-JRB
80
between July 10, 2003, and November 12, 2003. It submitted an
81
Inspection Claim to the contracting officer on November 7, 2003.
The contracting officer did not take action on any of the claims
within the sixty days prescribed by the statute, so, pursuant to 41
U.S.C. § 605(c)(5), they became appealable as a deemed denial
82
between September 8, 2003, and January 11, 2004.
Phillips
appealed all but the Inspection Claim to the Board between
83
September 8, 2003, and January 11, 2004. One of the claims was
settled, but an administrative judge (“AJ”) heard the remaining eight
appeals between March 29 and April 2, 2004, and decided them from
84
the bench. The parties ultimately settled the nine Board appeals
through a global settlement agreement, and on June 30, 2005, the

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Distributed Solutions, 539 F.3d at 1346.
Id.
524 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1266–67.
Id. at 1266.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1267.
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As of January 2006, the
Board entered judgment accordingly.
contracting officer still had not issued a final decision with respect to
the Inspection Claim, so, on January 19, 2006, Phillips appealed that
87
claim in the COFC. Following the contracting officer’s issuance of
his final decision, the Government filed a motion for summary
judgment based upon the doctrine of claim preclusion, which the
88
COFC granted.
As the Federal Circuit observed, the doctrine of finality provides
that, when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case,
it is a finality, not only to the claims in controversy, but also to “‘any
other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
89
purpose.’” The court noted that “[c]laim preclusion applies when:
‘(1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the first suit proceeded
to a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the second claim is based
90
on the same set of transactional facts as the first.’” Claim preclusion
applies to boards of contract appeals that are acting in a judicial
capacity and resolving disputes which the parties had an adequate
91
opportunity to litigate.
The Federal Circuit considered and rejected all three of Phillips’s
arguments that claim preclusion did not apply. In its first argument,
92
93
Phillips contended that § 609(a)(1) together with § 609(d) of the
94
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (“CDA”), permits a claimant to split
85. Id.
86. The contracting officer denied the claim in its entirety in a decision issued
on June 9, 2006, because “‘pursuant to the legal principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel,’” the issues raised by the Inspection Claim were included in
Phillips’s other, finally adjudicated claims. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1267–68 (quoting Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129–30
(1983)).
90. Id. at 1268 (quoting Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1055 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
91. Id. (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422
(1966)).
92. Section 609(a)(1) permits contractors to choose a forum for their appeals:
“[I]n lieu of appealing the decision of the contracting officer . . . to an agency board,
a contractor may bring an action directly on the claim in the United States Court of
Federal Claims, notwithstanding any contract provision, regulation, or rule of law to
the contrary.” 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(1) (2006).
93. Section 609(d) provides:
If two or more suits arising from one contract are filed in the United States
Court of Federal Claims and one or more agency boards, for the
convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice, the
United States Court of Federal Claims may order the consolidation of such
suits in that court or transfer any suits to or among the agency boards
involved.
41 U.S.C. § 609(d).
94. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601–613.
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claims arising from the same contract between an agency board of
95
Conceding that the statute is
contract appeals and the COFC.
somewhat ambiguous as to whether it permits “the filing of all claims
arising from a single contract in separate fora,” or “only claims that
do not arise from the same transactional facts,” the Federal Circuit
96
examined the history of the CDA. The court noted that, in the
Senate Committees on Governmental Affairs and the Judiciary
version of the CDA, section 609(d) would have expressly permitted
97
claim splitting. However, Congress removed section 609(d) before
98
it was passed, and the Senate’s draft of section 609(e) became
99
section 609(d) in the current version of the statute. The Federal
Circuit concluded that “[t]he elimination of original subsection (d)
strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to allow contractors to
avoid the effects of claim preclusion by splitting factually related
100
The court noted, in addition, that the amendment
claims.”
deleting the original section 609(d) was accompanied by Senate
Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd’s explanation:
The amendment . . . is out of a concern that the section might be
interpreted as permitting the contractors to split claims arising out
of the same set of facts, thereby needlessly multiplying causes of
action and encouraging forum shopping. It is not the intention of
the committees to change the present law regarding joinder,
101
compulsory counterclaims and definition of separate claims.

Based upon this passage, the Federal Circuit concluded that
“Congress definitively rejected the idea that the CDA was abrogating
the doctrine of claim preclusion and permitting the splitting of
95. Phillips/May, 524 F.3d at 1268.
96. Id. at 1268–69.
97. Section 609(d) provided:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, and notwithstanding any statute or
other rule of law, or any contract provision, every claim founded upon the
same express or implied contract with the United States shall constitute a
separate cause of action for purposes of any suit in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and such court may, in its discretion, consolidate separate
claims for purposes of decision or judgment, or delay acting on claim
pending action on another claim.
124 CONG. REC. 36,263 (1978) (emphasis added).
98. Section 609(e) provided for the consolidation of split claims by the Court of
Claims:
If two or more suits arising from one contract are filed in the Court of
Claims and one or more agency boards, for the convenience of parties or
witnesses, in the interest of justice, the Court of Claims may order the
consolidation of such suits in that court or transfer any suits to or among the
agency boards involved.
Id. (emphasis added).
99. Phillips/May, 524 F.3d at 1269.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1267 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 36,267 (1978)).
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102

claims based on the same set of transactional facts.” Accordingly, it
103
rejected Phillips’s arguments to the contrary.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Phillips’s argument that it should
be permitted to split its claims because the claims could not have
104
been appealed together.
First, the court concluded that, even
though the contracting officer did not issue his final decision on
Phillips’s Inspection Claim until the other nine claims had been
adjudicated by the Board, it was within Phillips’s control to make all
105
Phillips “could not avoid the
ten claims ripen for review at once.
106
application of res judicata through strategic delay.”
Second, the
Federal Circuit concluded that, even though the Inspection Claim
did not qualify for the Small Claims Accelerated Procedure under
which the Board resolved the other nine claims, nothing in the CDA
supported Phillips’s contention that a contractor has an absolute
right to that accelerated procedure to prevent the application of
107
claims preclusion.
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Phillips’s contention that the
108
COFC could split the claims because they were factually distinct.
The Federal Circuit observed that courts would permit a party to split
claims “if, for example, the two claims involve[d] different sets of
109
transactional facts.” The court noted that such a determination is
made pragmatically, but that, within the contracts context, “claims
110
under a single contract generally must be brought together.” Even
though the case was decided before the enactment of the CDA, the
Federal Circuit adopted the rule applied in Container Transport
111
International, Inc. v. United States, that res judicata should bar a
second claim that is brought under a “‘single, indivisible contract,’”
“because ‘[t]here was no obstacle to putting both aspects of the
demand in one suit, and that would be the normal expectation for a
112
claimant [in the circumstances].’” The court, then, demonstrated
the significant overlap between the Inspection Claim and the various
design change, delay, and overzealous and delayed inspection claims,

102. Id. at 1270.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1271.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982).
111. 468 F.2d 926 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
112. Phillips/May, 524 F.3d at 1271–72 (alteration in original) (quoting Container
Transp. Int’l, 468 F.2d at 928–29).
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It
which were the subject of five of the claims before the Board.
concluded that the Inspection Claim and the Board appeals “were
114
Accordingly,
based on the ‘same set of transactional facts.’”
because the parties conceded that the claims involved the same
parties and that the Board proceeded to final judgment on the
115
merits, all three claim preclusion factors had been met. Thus, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the COFC correctly had determined
116
that Phillips’s complaint was barred by claim preclusion.
117

D. Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States
118

In Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States,
Mullica West Limited
(“Mullica”) and Park Terrace Limited (“Park Terrace”) challenged
the COFC’s decision that their breach of contract claims were barred
119
by the six-year statute of limitations found in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The
Federal Circuit held that the COFC correctly had concluded that the
statute of limitations period within which Mullica and Park Terrace
were required to file their breach of contract claims was not extended
120
In
by virtue of their entering into subsequent incentive contracts.
addition, the Federal Circuit determined that the COFC had not
121
erred when it stated that its opinions did not propose to dismiss
Mullica’s and Park Terrace’s claims regarding the incentive equity
122
loan contracts because they were not pled in the complaint.
Moreover, the circuit court concluded that the COFC did not abuse
its discretion when it refused to allow Mullica and Park Terrace to
amend their complaint to introduce separate and independent
123
causes of action.
This case arose out of Mullica’s and Park Terrace’s loans from the
Farmers Home Administration of the United States Department of
Agriculture (“FmHA”) “to further the government’s interest in
113. Id. at 1272–73.
114. Id. at 1273 (quoting Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1055 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 550 F.3d 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1136–37. Section 2501 provides that “[e]very claim of which the United
States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition
thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501
(2006).
120. Id. at 1145.
121. This appeal stems from three COFC opinions: Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States,
81 Fed. Cl. 511 (2008); Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 724 (2008); and
Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 512 (2007).
122. Tamerlane, 550 F.3d at 1146.
123. Id.
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124

providing rental housing for low and moderate income persons.”
Mullica and Park Terrace contended that the Government breached
their loan agreements when the Government refused to allow them
to prepay the remaining mortgage balance for the loan to enable
them to convert the property from rental housing for low- and
125
Mullica
moderate-income persons to market-rate rental property.
submitted its initial offer to prepay its loan in an October 1988
126
127
letter.
The FmHA denied Mullica’s request on March 30, 1989.
On March 14, 1991, the FmHA offered Mullica an incentive equity
loan, requiring Mullica to agree to continue using the property for
128
low- and moderate-income housing for twenty years.
Mullica took
129
out this incentive equity loan on June 18, 1991. Park Terrace
requested to prepay its loan on November 19, 1991, and the FmHA
denied this request in a June 1992 letter, which also included an offer
to take out an incentive equity loan similar to the one offered to
130
Mullica.
Park Terrace entered into this new incentive equity loan
131
agreement with FmHA in 1993. Mullica and Park Terrace filed suit
132
in the COFC in 2005.
The thrust of Mullica’s and Park Terrace’s argument on appeal was
133
that, within the meaning of Franconia Associates v. United States, the
134
prepayment offers did not constitute “tender” of prepayment. They
contend that the Government’s response—the offering of incentive
loans—constituted a breach of the Government’s obligation to accept
135
136
The Federal Circuit disagreed.
It
prepayment at any time.
determined that the “Franconia decision requires no more formalism
than the written request to prepay followed by non-acceptance of the
request by the government to trigger the running to the statute of
137
limitations.” It held that the COFC correctly had ruled that, by the
dates that Mullica and Park Terrace had entered into the incentive
138
The Federal
loans, “breach-triggering rejections had occurred.”
124. Id. at 1137.(citing Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 134
(2002)).
125. Id. at 1138–39.
126. Id. at 1138.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 536 U.S. 129, 134 (2002).
134. Id. at 1143.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Circuit, furthermore, rejected the argument that the prepayment
letters “were just part of a mechanical process to get incentives, and
were never intended to declare the government in breach of the
139
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
underlying loan agreements.”
ruled that the six-year statute of limitations expired in 1997 for
140
Mullica and in 1998 for Park Terrace.
II. BID PROTESTS/PREFERENCES
141

A. Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of Defense
142

Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of Defense
(Rothe VII)
concerned the constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. § 2323 (Section 1207 of
the Small Business Act), which in relevant part “sets a ‘goal’ that five
percent of federal defense contracting dollars for each fiscal year be
awarded to certain entities including small business concerns owned
and controlled by ‘socially and economically disadvantaged
143
individuals.’” At issue here was whether section 1207, on its face, as
reenacted in 2006, violated the right to equal protection under the
144
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Rothe Development Corporation (“Rothe”) bid on a contract with
the U.S. Department of the Air Force (“Air Force”) to maintain,
operate, and repair computer and communications systems at one of
145
The solicitation at issue was subject to the
the Air Force bases.
section 1207 program, which grants businesses owned by certain
minorities and certified as small, disadvantaged businesses a
preference. One of Rothe’s competitor’s, International Computer
and Telecommunications, Inc. (“ICT”), which was owned by a
Korean-American couple and was certified as a small, disadvantaged
146
Because of the
business (“SDB”), also bid on the contract.
preference ICT received from the Air Force due to its SDB status, the
Air Force awarded the contract to ICT even though Rothe’s bid was
147
actually the lowest bid.

139. Id. at 1144.
140. Id. at 1145.
141. (Rothe VII), 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1026. The Small Business Act presumes that Black Americans, Asian
Americans, Hispanic Americans and Native Americans are socially disadvantaged
individuals. Id.
144. Id. at 1027.
145. Id. at 1030.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Rothe protested the Air Force’s award to ICT in the District Court
of the Western District of Texas challenging the constitutionality of
148
section 1207. The district court granted summary judgment to the
149
150
Government, after which Rothe appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and
remanded for further proceedings because “‘the district court
improperly applied a deferential legal standard rather than “strict
scrutiny,” and also impermissibly relied on post-reauthorization
evidence to support [section 1207’s] constitutionality as
151
Ultimately, the district court found section 1207
reauthorized.’”
constitutional, holding that “the 2006 Reauthorization of the
1207 Program satisfie[d] the requirements of strict scrutiny,” that
“Congress had a compelling interest when it reauthorized the
1207 Program,” that the “compelling interest was supported by a
‘strong basis in the evidence’” and that the 1207 Program was
152
narrowly tailored to that compelling interest.
Rothe appealed, contending that, contrary to the district court’s
holding, on its face section 1207, as reenacted in 2006, violates the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment right to due
153
process.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Rothe and, as discussed
154
below, reversed the judgment of the district court.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by explaining that “[b]ecause
Section 1207 incorporates an explicit racial classification—the
presumption that members of certain minority groups are ‘socially
disadvantaged’ for purposes of obtaining SDB status and the benefits
that flow from that status under Section 1207 itself—the statute is
155
In applying strict scrutiny, the court
subject to strict scrutiny.”
considered, inter alia, whether the Government has a “compelling
interest in ‘remedying the effects of past or present racial
discrimination’” and whether Congress had a “strong basis in
evidence” to believe that remedial action based on race was
148. Id.
149. Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe I), 49 F. Supp. 2d 937, 954
(W.D. Tex. 1999).
150. Rothe initially appealed to the Fifth Circuit, but the Fifth Circuit transferred
the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit based on that
part of Rothe’s claim was based on the “Little Tucker Act.” Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Def., 194 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) (Rothe II).
151. Rothe VII, 545 F.3d at 1031 (alteration in original) (quoting Rothe Dev. Corp.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe III), 262 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
152. Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VI), 499 F. Supp. 2d 775, 884
(W.D. Tex. 2007).
153. Rothe VII, 545 F.3d at 1035.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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156

The district court had held that the Government
necessary.
satisfied its burden of producing a strong basis in the evidence for
remedial action based on “non-stale statistical and anecdotal evidence
before Congress [that] ‘constitute[d] prima facie proof of a
nationwide pattern or practice of discrimination in both public and
157
private contracting.’” On this point, the Federal Circuit disagreed,
explaining that the studies at issue “do not provide a substantially
probative and broad-based statistical foundation necessary for the
‘strong basis in evidence’ that must be the predicate for nationwide,
158
race-conscious action.”
Accordingly, the court held section 1207 to be unconstitutional,
stating that “because Congress did not have a ‘strong basis in
evidence’ upon which to conclude that DOD was a passive participant
in pervasive, nationwide racial discrimination—at least not on the
evidence produced by DOD and relied on by the district court in this
159
case—the statute fails strict scrutiny.”
The Court reversed the
judgment of the district court in part, and remanded with
instructions to enter a judgment declaring that section 1207, as
enacted in 2006, was facially unconstitutional and to enjoin
160
application of the current 10 U.S.C. § 2323.
III. CONTRACT FORMATION
161

A. Mola Development Corp. v. United States
162

In Mola Development Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
addressed two contract issues: (1) when the statute of limitations
began to run on a thrift’s Winstar-related, breach-of-contract claim,
and (2) whether the Government intended to form a supervisory
163
merger contract regarding the regulatory treatment of goodwill.
The Federal Circuit determined that the statute of limitations was not
triggered until regulations promulgated under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
164
The Federal
(“FIRREA”) became effective on December 7, 1989.
156. Id. at 1036.
157. Id. (alteration in original).
158. Id. at 1040.
159. Id. at 1050.
160. Id.
161. 516 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1373. For a brief introduction and background on the Winstar line of
cases, see infra Part VII (discussing the Winstar cases, which arose from the 1970s
savings and loan crisis).
164. Mola, 516 F.3d at 1377.
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Circuit also held that documents, negotiations, and the designation
of the merger as “supervisory” failed to show the Government’s intent
165
to agree to a goodwill contract.
Mola Development Corporation (“Mola”) owned a controlling
interest in Charter Savings Bank (“Charter”), a troubled savings and
166
Mola identified Merit Savings Bank (“Merit”), another
loan.
troubled financial institution, as a suitable merger partner with
167
Charter.
Mola subsequently met with the Government to discuss
the regulatory approval of the proposed merger between Charter and
Merit, which required authorization from the Federal Home Loan
168
Bank Board (“FHLBB”).
In these meetings, “Mola requested that
the government classify the merger as supervisory and that it allow
Mola to make a non-cash contribution . . . to bring the merged entity
169
into compliance with capital requirements.”
Although neither
request was granted at the time, Mola subsequently filed a formal
application with the FHLBB of the proposed merger, which
170
“provided for use of the purchase method of accounting and
171
amortization of any resulting regulatory goodwill over a period not
172
to exceed twenty-five years.”
After the formal application was
submitted, the Government stated that it would not accept the
merger without a cash contribution sufficient to the meet the
173
regulatory minimum capital levels. In a subsequent letter, FHLBB
174
preliminarily approved the merger and classified it as “supervisory.”
However, “[t]he FHLBB’s approval letter did not mention regulatory
175
treatment of goodwill.”
On July 31, 1989, one year after the

165. Id. at 1378–80.
166. Id. at 1373.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The “purchase method of accounting” is addressed in the FHLBB’s Internal
Memorandum SP-24 dated December 29, 1981. Id. at 1379. Where a merger of
purchase of assets occurs, this method “calculates combined assets as if the dominant
entity purchased the acquired entity by assuming its liabilities.” Id. This is in
contrast to the pooling method, “which aggregates the assets and liabilities of the
merging entities.” Id. The purchase method is the only method that recognizes
goodwill as an asset of the merged entity. Id.
171. Under FIRREA, “supervisory goodwill” is defined to mean “‘goodwill
resulting from the . . . combination of any savings association where the market value
of the assets acquired was less than the market value of the liabilities at the time of
the transaction and where the accounting treatment of the goodwill has been
approved by the [FHLBB].’” Id. at 1380 n.8 (alterations in original) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 432 (1989), as reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 228).
172. Id. at 1373.
173. Id. at 1373–74.
174. Id. at 1374.
175. Id.

1070

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1051

merger, the FHLBB designated Charter as a “troubled institution,”
imposed restrictions on its ability to increase its assets or liabilities,
and noted the probability that Charter would not be able to comply
with the stricter capital requirements that would soon be imposed by
176
FIRREA. FIRREA, enacted on August 9, 1989, prohibited the use of
177
The newly-created Office of
regulatory goodwill as a capital asset.
Thrift Supervision subsequently issued regulations implementing
178
FIRREA, which became effective on December 7, 1989.
Because
Charter was not in compliance with the new regulations, the
179
Government seized Charter and liquidated its assets.
On December 5, 1995, Mola filed a compliant in the COFC
arguing, inter alia, “that the implementation of FIRREA breached a
180
contract between Mola and the government.” The COFC denied a
Government motion to dismiss on the ground that Mola’s breach of
contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations, but granted
summary judgment to the Government, finding no contract between
181
The Government
Mola and the Government relating to goodwill.
appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss on statute of limitations
182
grounds and Mola appealed the judgment on the merits.
i.

Statute of Limitations
Under the Tucker Act, claims against the Government are subject
183
to a six-year statute of limitations.
On appeal, the Government
argued that the COFC erred in holding that the limitations period
did not begin to run until after the FIRREA regulations became
184
The Government argued that the
effective on December 7, 1989.
statute of limitations began to run when FIRREA was enacted on
August 9, 1989, thus precluding Mola’s claims filed more than six
185
years later on December 5, 1995. The Federal Circuit rejected the
186
Government’s argument, citing Bank of America FSB v. Doumani,
which held that the mere passage of FIRREA did not trigger the

176. Id.
177. Id. A more detailed history and circumstances surrounding the thrift crisis
and enactment of FIRREA are discussed in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,
843–58 (1996).
178. Mola, 516 F.3d at 1374.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1374–75.
182. Id. at 1375.
183. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 495 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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187

Alternatively, the
limitations period for Winstar claims.
Government argued that the statute of limitations began to run on
July 31, 1989, when FHLBB designated Charter as a “troubled
188
The Federal
institution” and imposed restrictions on Charter.
Circuit has recognized instances where the statute of limitations may
be triggered before the adoption of FIRREA’s implementing
regulations, but there must be “‘a requirement for [the thrift] to take
189
specific action contrary to its existing contract.’” Although the July
31, 1989 letter imposed restrictions on Charter, these restrictions
related to concerns about “management, operating margins, level of
tangible capital, and business plan, and were not based on the
190
Accordingly, the Federal
impending enactment of FIRREA.”
Circuit rejected the Government’s argument and concluded that that
statute of limitations was not triggered until the regulations became
191
Because Mola’s claims were filed
effective on December 7, 1989.
within six years of this date, the statute of limitations did not bar
192
Mola’s claim.
ii. Intent to Enter into a Winstar Contract
Like any other government contract, in order for a Winstar plaintiff
to prevail on a breach-of-contract claim, a plaintiff must show, inter
193
alia, intent to enter into a Winstar contract. The Federal Circuit has
previously found that “‘regulatory proclamations are insufficient to
create contractual obligations because . . . [m]ere approval of the
194
Although a
merger does not amount to [an] intent to contract.’”
formal written agreement is not necessary, there must be “something
195
more” than mere regulatory approval of a merger.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found “no evidence of any
negotiations about the regulatory treatment of goodwill that could
serve as evidence that the Government agreed to a goodwill
196
contract.” Mola argued that the negotiation over the designation of
the merger as “supervisory” was in effect a negotiation of the
treatment of goodwill because such a designation was necessary
187. Id. at 1375.
188. Mola, 516 F.3d at 1376.
189. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bank of Am., 495 F.3d at 1372).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1377.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1378.
194. Id. (alterations in original).
195. Id. (quoting D & N Bank v. United States, 331 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
196. Id.
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under the regulations to allow use of the purchase method of
accounting, the only method of accounting recognizing goodwill as
197
an asset. The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, finding that the
regulations did not specifically address the purchase method of
198
accounting.
Furthermore, “[n]othing in [FHLBB’s Internal]
Memorandum SP-24 suggest[ed] that whether the merger has been
designated as supervisory [wa]s even relevant, let alone
determinative, of the availability of the purchase method of
199
Mola also argued that the Government must have
accounting.”
intended to form a contract relating to goodwill because Charter
would not have had sufficient capital to meet the regulatory
requirements without the inclusion of goodwill in the capital
200
calculation.
Relying on previous decisions that rejected similar
arguments, the Federal Circuit concluded that the mere fact that the
Government approved a merger that, without inclusion of goodwill in
Charter’s capital calculation, would have resulted in a level below the
regulatory minimum does not establish the Government’s intent to
201
Finding no
contract to maintain the same treatment of goodwill.
evidence of intent to contract, the Federal Circuit affirmed the entry
of summary judgment in favor of the Government on Mola’s breach
202
of contract claim.
Judge Newman dissented on the ruling that there was no contract
203
between Mola and the Government. According to Judge Newman,
the written exchanges and agency documentation produced an
integrated contract leaving “no doubt” that a contract including
204
supervisory goodwill was intended and formed.
Contrary to the
majority panel’s opinion, Judge Newman argued that the
classification of “supervisory” does achieve the regulatory treatment
of goodwill, which was essential both to Mola’s agreement to acquire
Merit and to the merged institution’s compliance with capital
205
requirements.
As the Supreme Court explained in Winstar, it was
understood by healthy thrifts that absent accounting for supervisory
goodwill there would be little reason to assume the liabilities of a
197. Id. at 1379.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1380.
201. Id. (citing D & N Bank v. United States, 331 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
202. Id. at 1381.
203. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman concurred with the panel
majority’s ruling on the statute of limitations issue. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1382.
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206

According to Judge Newman, the formal merger
troubled bank.
application, the negotiations with the Government, and the
treatment of the merger as supervisory confirmed a bargained-for
exchange resulting in a contractual arrangement that was breached
207
by the enactment of FIRREA.
208

B. Suess v. United States

In this shareholder derivative suit, the Federal Circuit also
addressed the issue of Government intent to enter into a Winstar
209
contract. In Suess v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that the
shareholders of a failed savings and loan did not establish the
existence of a contract with the Government pursuant to which the
Government guaranteed the continued use of purchase accounting
210
or the amortization of supervisory goodwill.
In 1982, Equitable Savings and Loan Association (“Equitable”), a
thrift institution in danger of failure, entered into merger discussions
with Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Association
211
(“Franklin”).
In order to complete the merger and obtain the
approval of the FHLBB, Franklin representatives presented a business
plan for the potential merger between Franklin and Equitable to the
212
Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle (“FHLB-Seattle”).
In their
presentation, Franklin requested the use of purchase accounting in
213
order to treat goodwill as regulatory capital. Franklin subsequently
submitted a proposal to FHLB-Seattle requesting the use of purchase
accounting, followed by a formal application for the merger with
proposed amortization of the goodwill acquired from the merger
214
Thereafter, the FHLBB entered into
over a forty-year period.
discussions with Franklin regarding approval of the merger and
specifically discussed the use of purchase accounting and the
215
amortization of goodwill over a forty-year period.
FHLB-Seattle
prepared a merger digest that described the conditional approval of
the merger, the key terms of the approval, and stated that the merger
216
would be accounted for under the purchase method.
Franklin’s
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1385–86.
535 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id. at 1354–55.
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board approved the merger and, in compliance with the conditions
placed by FHLB-Seattle, submitted a financial analysis of the
proposed merger based on the usage of purchase accounting and
217
amortization of the acquired goodwill over a period of forty years.
Congress subsequently enacted FIRREA, which required thrifts to
maintain a set minimum capital requirement and prohibited the use
218
of supervisory goodwill.
Pursuant to FIRREA, the newly created
Office of Thrift Supervision issued regulations denying the continued
219
use of supervisory goodwill in the thrifts’ accounting procedures.
220
This regulatory change resulted in Franklin becoming insolvent.
Suess subsequently brought a derivative suit in the COFC on behalf of
221
Franklin for the losses suffered as a result of the passage of FIRREA.
Over the course of several decisions, the COFC found that a
contract arose between Franklin and the Government relating to the
222
Specifically, the COFC found that, when
merger with Equitable.
considered together, the documents generated during the approval
of the merger showed the Government’s intent to guarantee
continued use of purchase accounting and amortization of
223
goodwill.
The COFC found that the Government breached its
contract by phasing out the use of goodwill to satisfy regulatory
capital requirements, and, following a trial, awarded Suess
224
approximately $52 million in damages. The Government appealed
these decisions on several grounds but, most importantly, argued that
the COFC “erred as a matter of law in holding that a contract existed
between Franklin and the government for the treatment of goodwill
225
arising out of the [merger].”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Government that
no contract existed between Franklin and the Government for the
treatment of goodwill arising from the merger and reversed the
226
Although the Federal Circuit recognized
decision of the COFC.
that a contract may result from negotiations involving multiple
documents, there must be a clear indication of intent to contract for

217. Id. at 1355.
218. Id. (citing Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) (2006)).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1356.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1358.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1359.
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227

concluding that a contract was formed. In order to prove that the
Government intended to guarantee continued use of purchase
accounting or a specific amortization period, “the party alleging the
existence of such a contract must allege ‘something more’ than the
228
mere approval of the merger by the FHLBB.” In past decisions, the
Federal Circuit has held that the mere approval of a merger does not
amount to intent to contract because the FHLBB must, in serving its
229
regulatory and sovereign functions, approve all mergers.
Instead,
“‘there must be an objective manifestation of voluntary, mutual
assent’” to a contract guaranteeing a particular treatment of
230
goodwill.
Reviewing the correspondence, application, and digest relating to
the merger between Franklin and Equitable, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the documentary evidence showed that FHLBB
“approved Franklin’s use of purchase accounting and amortization of
goodwill”, but “did not contractually guarantee Franklin’s continued
ability to utilize the purchase method of accounting or to amortize
231
In an attempt to support the existence of a contract,
goodwill.”
Suess submitted affidavits by Franklin’s president describing
negotiations with FHLB-Seattle representatives regarding the use of
232
the forty-year amortization period. Suess also provided affidavits of
former FHLBB and FHLB-Seattle officials from 1996 indicating that
the Government believed it was contractually obligated to honor the
amortization period originally allowed and that the forty-year
amortization period was an important part of the consideration
233
received by Franklin for merging with Equitable.
The Federal
Circuit regarded Franklin’s reference to the 1982 negotiations to be
“self-serving” and insufficient to prove the Government’s intent to
contract, especially given the number of documents created at the
time of merger that did not mention a contract between Franklin and
the FHLBB relating to purchase accounting or the amortization of
234
goodwill. Similarly, the Federal Circuit concluded that affidavits of
former FHLBB and FHLB-Seattle officials expressing a belief in 1996
that the approved merger between Franklin and Equitable in 1982
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1360 (citing D & N Bank v. United States, 331 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
229. Id. (citing D & N Bank, 331 F.3d at 1378).
230. Id. (quoting Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
231. Id. at 1362.
232. Id. at 1364.
233. Id. at 1364–65.
234. Id. at 1364.
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committed the Government were insufficient to overcome the lack of
any binding language in documents exchanged at the time of the
235
In sum, the evidence did not demonstrate
merger agreement.
236
“something more” than mere regulatory approval.
Accordingly,
because a contract did not arise between Franklin and the
Government regarding the Franklin merger, the Federal Circuit
reversed the decision of the COFC, vacated the entire award of
damages, and remanded the case to the COFC to determine whether
any damages were available relating to the Government’s breach of
237
contract relating to a separate merger transaction.
IV. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
238

A. St. Christopher Associates v. United States
239

In St. Christopher Associates v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the Government and
concluded that the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) did not breach its Regulatory Agreement with
St. Christopher Associates L.P. (“St. Christopher”) by not considering
St. Christopher’s request for a rent increase for an apartment project
where the Regulatory Agreement did not expressly, nor by
240
implication, require HUD to consider such a request.
On December 19, 1984, HUD entered into a Provisional Workout
Arrangement (“PWA”) with St. Christopher whereby St. Christopher
became the owner of an apartment project in Hartford,
241
Connecticut. Pursuant to the PWA, St. Christopher agreed to make
242
the former owner’s mortgage and interest arrearage payments. On
December 28, 1984, St. Christopher and HUD executed an
Agreement for Modification of Note and Mortgage (“Modification
Agreement”), which incorporated the terms of the PWA, and a
Regulatory Agreement, which put restrictions on the use and
243
operation of the apartment project.
Prior to the execution of the
PWA, the Modification Agreement, and the Regulatory Agreement,
HUD approved St. Christopher’s request for a rent increase based on
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1368.
511 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the cost of electricity, reserve for replacements, and operational
244
St. Christopher requested several additional rent
expenses.
increases in the 1980s, but HUD did not approve any of the requests
on grounds that it was not obligated to consider the requests because
St. Christopher had failed to make the mortgage interest arrearage
payments required under the PWA and the Modification
245
Agreement. On January 6, 1989, HUD sent St. Christopher a letter
indicating that HUD had not received mortgage interest arrearage
payments for 1988 and 1989 and that if HUD did not receive
payment within thirty days, it would commence foreclosure
246
proceedings. Although the court could not discern what happened
between 1989 and 1996, on November 6, 1996, HUD requested that
St. Christopher submit a plan on how it would comply with the
247
PWA.
On September 25, 1997, St. Christopher submitted an
248
additional request for a rent increase, but HUD did not respond.
On January 3, 2001, HUD issued a Notice of Default and
249
Foreclosure.
St. Christopher submitted one last rent increase
250
request on May 29, 2002, which HUD granted on July 2, 2002. St.
Christopher filed its lawsuit on September 24, 2003 and later sold the
apartment project and paid HUD the outstanding mortgage interest
251
arrearages.
St. Christopher argued to the COFC that HUD’s failure to act upon
252
its 1997 rent increase request was, inter alia, a breach of contract.
The COFC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction to the
extent St. Christopher sought relief based on HUD’s alleged
violations of section 236 of the National Housing Act, its
implementing regulations, and agency guidance, concluding that
none of these provides a substantive right to money damages
253
necessary for COFC jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the COFC granted
summary judgment and found that HUD’s failure to respond to the
244. Id. at 1379.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1380.
253. Id.; see also St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2006)
(“Neither Section 236 of the National Housing Act, the implementing regulations,
nor the agency guidance contain express provisions mandating that a mortgager
receive money damages if HUD fails to consider a rent increase request.”). On
appeal, St. Christopher conceded that none of the statutes, regulations or guidance
is money-mandating. St. Christopher Assocs., 511 F.3d at 1380 n.2.
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rent increase request did not breach the express provisions of the
254
Regulatory Agreement.
On appeal, St. Christopher argued that the COFC erred in
granting the Government’s summary judgment motion, contending
that the Regulatory Agreement expressly and implicitly required the
255
The Federal
Government to consider the rent increase request.
Circuit disagreed with St. Christopher, however, and determined that
the Regulatory Agreement’s provisions purporting to establish an
express duty by HUD to consider a rent increase were directed to the
obligations of the owners in establishing and changing a fair market
256
rental charge.
There was no express language in these provisions
257
imposing a duty on HUD.
Turning to the question of whether the Regulatory Agreement
implicitly required HUD to consider the rent increase request, “St.
Christopher acknowledge[d] that the [contract] d[id] not
incorporate by reference any statutory, regulatory, or agency
guidance,” but argued that “the Regulatory Agreement inherently
258
include[d] an obligation to consider a rent increase request.”
Reviewing the rental charge provisions in section 236 of the National
259
Housing Act, the Federal Circuit found a requirement on the part
of the owner to establish a rental charge and seek the approval of
HUD, but found no obligation on the part of HUD to consider a
260
request to increase the rent.
The Federal Circuit did, however, conclude that HUD regulations
and agency guidance imposed on HUD an express obligation to
261
consider a rent increase request. First, HUD regulations require, in
relevant part, that “[a]fter HUD has considered the request for an
increase in rents . . . it will furnish the mortgagor with a written
statement of the reasons for approval, adjustment upward or
262
The Federal Circuit concluded this
downward, or disapproval.”
regulation “does indeed obligate HUD to consider and respond to a
263
rent increase request, albeit within an unspecified time period.”

254. St. Christopher Assocs., 511 F.3d at 1380. The COFC also found that HUD did
not violate the Fifth Amendment takings clause. Id. The Federal Circuit affirmed.
Id. at 1386.
255. Id. at 1380.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1381.
259. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(f)(1)(A) (2006).
260. St. Christopher Assocs., 511 F.3d at 1381.
261. Id. at 1382.
262. Id. (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 245.325(b) (2008)).
263. Id.
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Second, a HUD Handbook requires the agency to “[i]ssue decision
letters within [thirty] days after receipt of the formal rent increase
request” and notes that “requests for additional information must be
made in writing and within [thirty] days of receipt of initial
264
package.” Like the regulation, the Federal Circuit determined that
the HUD Handbook “clearly requires HUD to respond to a rent
increase request, or request additional information, within thirty days
265
of the request.”
Because neither the regulation nor the HUD
Handbook were incorporated by reference into the Regulatory
Agreement, however, the Federal Circuit would need to hold one or
266
both provisions incorporated by implication.
The Federal Circuit is generally reluctant to incorporate statutory
or regulatory provisions into a Government contract unless the
267
contract explicitly provides for their incorporation. In this case, the
Federal Circuit found “no reference whatsoever in the Regulatory
Agreement to the implementing regulations or to the HUD
268
Handbook.”
The Federal Circuit distinguished the cases cited by
St. Christopher from this case, finding those cases involved express
language in contracts that imposed a duty on the Government to act
269
on rent increase requests.
“[T]here is simply no Federal Circuit
precedent holding that it is proper to read into a contract statutes,
regulations, or agency guidance when they are not incorporated by
270
reference into the contract.”
Because the Regulatory Agreement
did not incorporate by implication either the HUD regulation or
Handbook, the Federal Circuit found no basis to conclude that HUD
breached the contract by failing to consider the 1997 rent increase
request and concluded the COFC did not err in granting summary
271
judgment to the Government on the breach-of-contract claim.

264. Id. at 1383.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1384 (citing Smithson v. United States, 847 F.2d 791, 794 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
268. Id.
269. Id. (discussing Christopher Village, L.P. v. Retsinas, 190 F.3d 310 (5th Cir.
1999), Brighton Village Assocs. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and
Crest A Apartments Ltd., II v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 607 (2002)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1385.
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B. Northrop-Grumman Information Technology, Inc.
272
v. United States
273

In Northrop-Grumman Information Technology, Inc. v. United States,
the Federal Circuit addressed incorporation by reference in the
government contract context and held that a letter containing a
warranty of essential need was not incorporated by reference into a
contract, thus precluding a contractor from pursuing a breach-of274
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit concluded that
warranty claim.
the contract’s integration clause, which did not incorporate the letter
275
containing the warranty, prevented the use of the letter.
This
decision provides useful guidance on incorporation by reference as
well as the drafting and use of integration clauses.
Starburst Software (“Starburst”) created a software program known
276
In 1999, Starburst representatives spoke to an
as Omnicast.
employee at the Army’s Communication-Electronics Command
(“CECOM”) about using Omnicast to increase the efficiency in
277
Because
communications between CECOM’s computer systems.
Starburst did not have an existing contract with the Army, the parties
planned to use a preexisting contract between the Air Force and
Logicon Inc., now known as Northrop Grumman Information
Technology, Inc. (“Northrop”), whereby “Starburst would sell the
software to [Northrop]; [Northrop] would lease the software to the
Air Force; CECOM would receive the software; and CECOM would
transfer money to the Air Force to support Air Force lease payments
278
to [Northrop].” Before the Air Force issued a delivery order for the
software and before the Army even received or tested the software,
Northrop asked the Army to sign a “Letter of Essential Need,” which
identified the software as “essential to the operation of” and “integral
279
A representative of CECOM
to” certain Army computer systems.
signed the letter, and the Air Force subsequently issued a Delivery
280
Order to Northrop. The Delivery Order stated that the “‘LEASING
TERMS AND CONDITIONS’ to Special Offer #330 Revision 03” were
281
incorporated by reference.
Those “LEASING TERMS AND

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

535 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
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CONDITIONS,” in turn, stated that it was “‘mutually understood and
agreed that as inducement for Contractor entering into this
Agreement, the Government has provided required information
282
The Lease
relative to the essential use of the software Asset.’”
Terms and Conditions also contained an integration clause, which, in
relevant part, read “[t]he [] applicable Delivery Order and these
lease terms and conditions constitute the entire agreement between
[Northrop]
(“Contractor”)
and
the
U.S.
Government
(“Government”) relative to the CECOM Starburst lease transaction
283
under the aforementioned contract.” CECOM accepted delivery of
the software, and, through the Air Force, paid Northrop for the base
284
period and a one-year renewal term of the contract. Upon testing,
however, CECOM discovered that the software did not work
effectively with its computer systems in a tactical environment and
decided it would not renew the software lease after the one-year
285
renewal term expired in November 2001.
Northrop subsequently filed claims under the Contract Disputes
Act with the Contracting Officer, alleging CECOM’s non-renewal of
286
the software lease constituted a breach of contract.
After the
Contracting Officer denied the claims, Northrop filed suit in the
COFC arguing that the United States breached its contract by
warranting in the Letter of Essential Need that the Omnicast software
was essential when actually it was acquired on a test basis and was not
287
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the COFC
essential.
held, in relevant part, that the United States could not be liable
because “‘the Contract d[id] not, as a matter of law, incorporate the
288
Letter of Essential Need by reference.’”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s conclusion
that the contract did not incorporate the Letter of Essential Need,
thus precluding Northrop’s claim for breach of warranty under the
289
Due to the paucity of government contract cases
contract.
addressing incorporation by reference, the Federal Circuit reviewed
several patent cases and cases in other courts to support the following
general principle of incorporation by reference:

282. Id. (emphasis omitted).
283. Id. (second alteration in original).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1342–43.
287. Id. at 1343.
288. Id. (quoting Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc. v. United States, 78 Fed.
Cl. 45, 48 (2007)).
289. Id. at 1347.
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[T]he language used in a contract to incorporate extrinsic material
by reference must explicitly, or at least precisely, identify the
written material being incorporated and must clearly communicate
that the purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced
material into the contract (rather than merely to acknowledge that
the referenced material is relevant to the contract, e.g., as
290
background law or negotiating history).

In this case, by explicitly referring to the “LEASING TERMS AND
CONDITIONS” and reciting that they “were incorporated,” the
291
Delivery Order properly incorporated these terms and conditions.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with Northrop’s position, however,
that the Terms and Conditions’ reference to the Government
providing “required information relative to the essential use of the
software” incorporated by reference the Letter of Essential Need’s
statement that the leased software was “essential to the operation of”
292
The Terms and
and “integral to” CECOM’s computer systems.
Conditions “do not refer to the Letter of Essential Need explicitly, as
293
by title or date, or otherwise in any similarly clear, precise matter.”
Without an explicit reference, the “required information” language
in the Terms and Conditions could be interpreted to apply to any
294
number of prior communications between the parties.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Terms and
Conditions’ integration clause “prevent[ed]” Northrop from relying
295
on the Letter of Essential Need. The integration clause’s language
that the Delivery Order and “lease terms and conditions constitute
the entire agreement” relating to the lease transaction “neither
incorporates the Letter of Essential Need nor permits its
incorporation or the incorporation by reference of any other
296
extrinsic document.”
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Northrop Grumman Information
Technology, Inc. v. United States, as well as its decision in St. Christopher
297
Associates v. United States,
provide useful guidance regarding
negotiating and drafting government contracts. Both cases are
important reminders that the Federal Circuit will be reluctant to
incorporate extrinsic material, whether it be a document, regulation,
290. Id. at 1345.
291. Id. at 1346.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1347.
296. Id. (emphasis omitted).
297. 511 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see supra Part IV.A (discussing this case in
detail).
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or some agency guidance, unless that incorporation by reference is
drafted in explicit terms. Parties seeking to use incorporation by
reference when drafting government contracts would be wise to
follow the Federal Circuit’s specific guidance:
Our Circuit . . . does not require “magic words” of reference or of
incorporation. However, we stress that parties contracting with the
government may easily avoid or at least minimize the risk of having
to litigate this issue by simply adopting widely-used and judiciallyapproved language of incorporation, such as “is hereby
incorporated by reference” or “is hereby incorporated as though
fully set forth herein,” and by including specific and sufficient
information identifying a particular document, such as the title,
date, parties to, and section headings of any document to be
298
incorporated.

Parties negotiating government contracts must also be mindful of
any integration clause included in the contract and the risks posed by
failing to incorporate extrinsic material as an exception to
299
integration language identifying the “entire contract.”
V. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE/BREACH
300

A. General Injectables & Vaccines, Inc. v. Gates
301

General Injectables & Vaccines, Inc. v. Gates (General Injectables II)
addresses the interpretation of the “excusable delay” provision of
Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 52.212-4(f) as it applies to
302
subcontractors/suppliers. Here, General Injectables and Vaccines,
Inc. (“GIV”), petitioned for a rehearing of the court’s March 19, 2008
decision in which the court affirmed a decision by the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”) to uphold the default
298. Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., 535 F.3d at 1346.
299. Professor Nash’s commentary on this case is relevant to the use of integration
clauses:
[The Federal Circuit’s decision] appears to lay down a very strict rule that a
statement that an agreement constitutes the “entire agreement” of the
parties will be dispositive. What the court appears to be requiring is that, if
the parties use such a statement that a contractual instrument is fully
integrated, they include any incorporated documents as exceptions to this
integration statement. Indeed, in the court’s discussion of prior decisions, it
identifies several cases where it has accepted the fact that a document was
incorporated by reference because it was included as an exception to such
integration language.
Ralph C. Nash, Incorporation by Reference: Be Explicit!, 22 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 184, 185–
86 (2008) (emphasis in original).
300. 527 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1376.
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termination of GIV’s contract with the Defense Supply Center
Philadelphia (“DSCP”) to supply flu vaccine.
In support of its petition for a rehearing, GIV contended that the
Federal Circuit’s “interpretation of the ‘excusable delays’ provision at
issue in this case, FAR 52.212-4(f), conflicts with several Court of
303
Specifically, GIV alleged that these Court of
Claims decisions.”
Claims cases “stand for the proposition that if the contractual delay
provision does not separately state that the contractor is liable for the
unexcused actions of its subcontractor, then subcontractor delays are
excusable as long as the contractor acted reasonably in selecting the
304
subcontractor.”
Although the court denied GIV’s request for a
rehearing, it supplemented its March 19, 2008 decision and discussed
the new issue of whether any Court of Claims decisions conflicted
with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation. Ultimately, however, as is
discussed in more detail below, the court found none of the Court of
Claims cases to be in conflict with Federal Circuit precedent, and
thus held that the failure of FAR 52.212-4(f) to state specifically that a
contractor is liable for unexcused subcontractor delays does not
305
change the fact that the contractor is liable for such delays.
As background, DSCP awarded a contract to GIV for influenza
vaccine for the 2004–2005 flu season. The contract contained FAR
52.212-4(f), which provided essentially that the contractor is liable for
306
default unless the default is the result of an “excusable delay.”
Further, the contract specified that delivery was “[d]ependent on
307
FDA release of vaccine.” Pursuant to the contract, Chiron Vaccines
(“Chiron”), located in the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) was responsible
for
the
vaccine
manufacturing
and
packaging
as
a
308
supplier/subcontractor to GIV.

303. Id. at 1375. GIV relied on: Poloron Prods. v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 588
(Ct. Cl. 1953), Climactic Rainwear Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 415 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
and H.B. Nelson Constr. Co. v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 375 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
304. General Injectables II, 527 F.3d at 1376.
305. Id. at 1378.
306. Specifically, FAR 52.212-4(f) reads as follows:
The Contractor shall be liable for default unless nonperformance is caused
by an occurrence beyond the reasonable control of the Contractor and
without its fault or negligence such as, acts of God or the public enemy, acts
of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires,
floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, unusually severe weather,
and delays of common carriers.
307. General Injectables & Vaccines, Inc. v. Gates (General Injectables I), 519 F.3d
1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 519 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2008), supplementing opinion on denial of reh’g, General Injectables II, 527 F.3d 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (alteration in original).
308. General Injectables I, 519 F.3d at 1362.
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Four months after DSCP awarded the contract to GIV, Chiron
notified the FDA that certain lots of its vaccine were contaminated by
bacteria and that it would not release any additional lots without
309
As a result of
United States and United Kingdom approval.
Chiron’s manufacturing problems, GIV advised the Government that
310
Then, the FDA
it would not likely be able to deliver any vaccine.
banned further imports of the specific flu vaccine and ordered that
none of the existing U.S. stocks of the vaccine be distributed for
311
Thereafter, DSCP terminated GIV’s contract for default
use.
because GIV “failed to make timely delivery . . . and . . . such failure
312
was not due to excusable delay.”
The ASBCA affirmed the
313
Government’s termination for default.
Before the court, GIV argued, inter alia, that because the
“excusable delay” clause “does not separately state that the contractor
is liable for the unexcused actions of its subcontractor, then
subcontractor delays are excusable as long as the contractor acted
314
The court rejected
reasonably in selecting the subcontractor.”
GIV’s reading of the clause and noted that the general rule is that the
failure of a contractor’s subcontractor does not provide a valid excuse
for the prime’s nonperformance, unless the subcontractor’s failure is
315
also shown to be excusable. In so ruling, the court noted that GIV’s
contention that failure of a subcontractor results in excusable delay
for the prime would “place a contractor who procures contract goods
through subcontract in a better position with respect to risk of
nonperformance than a contractor who manufactures the contract
316
goods itself.”
Thus the court reasoned, because Chiron had no
excuse, GIV should not be allowed to avoid liability for the breach
309. Id. On October 5, 2004, British authorities suspended Chiron’s license to
operate for three months. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1363. In GIV’s initial appeal to the Court, it argued that FDA release of
the vaccine was a “condition precedent to GIV’s delivery obligation,” but the court
rejected this argument, holding that “the essence of contract performance was
production of a vaccine that complied with the governing standards applied by the
FDA.” Id. at 1363, 1364.
312. Id. at 1363. (alterations in original).
313. Id.
314. General Injectables II, 527 F.3d 1375, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In support of its
contention, GIV attempts to distinguish the provision at issue, FAR 52.212-4(f), to
other FAR provisions also concerning reasonable delay, FAR 52.249-8(c) and FAR
52.249-14(a). Because these other FAR provisions, in contrast to FAR 52.212-4(f),
specifically refer to the liability of contractors for default of subcontractors, GIV
maintains that the absence of any reference to subcontractors in FAR 52.212-4(f) is
intentional and means that contractors are not liable for production failures by their
subcontractors. General Injectables I, 519 F.3d at 1365.
315. Id.
316. General Injectables II, 527 F.3d at 1377.
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when Chiron could not have avoided the liability had it been a prime
contractor. The court concluded that GIV “bore the risk of not being
able to perform unless it could show that the reason for its failure to
perform fell within the causes set forth in the ‘excusable delay’
clause. It could not shift that risk to the Government simply by
317
subcontracting production of the vaccine to a third party.”
318

B. International Technology Corp. v. Winter
319

In International Technology Corporation v. Winter,
the Federal
Circuit addressed, inter alia, the issue of establishing differing site
conditions in the context of a breach of contract claim. Initially,
International Technology Corporation (“ITC”) filed a claim for an
equitable adjustment of costs on behalf of its subcontractor at the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA” or “the
320
Board”).
The contract at issue was a cost-plus-fixed fee for the
321
treatment of contaminated soil at a Navy facility in California. The
ASBCA denied the claim based on the limitation of costs clause in
322
ITC’s prime contract.
ITC appealed to the Federal Circuit. First, the court agreed that
323
the Board was correct to deny ITC’s claim.
Next, the court
addressed a second contention raised by ITC that it had a valid pass324
through claim for breach of contract based on the Government’s
misrepresentation of the site conditions, i.e., differing site conditions,
325
at the Navy facility.
The court declined to decide this argument,
however, finding that even if it was decided in favor of ITC, ITC
would not prevail in the case as it failed on the first two prongs of the
326
differing site conditions claim.
Finally, the court turned to the
main focus of its decision—ITC’s differing site conditions claim.

317. Id. at 1379.
318. 523 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, No. 2007-1276, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17319 (Fed. Cir. July 21, 2008).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1344.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1346.
323. Id. at 1347.
324. “A pass-through claim allows a prime contractor to assert against the
government a claim for harm caused by the government to a subcontractor where
the subcontractor could hold the prime contractor liable for that harm.” Id. ITC
asserts that its subcontractor relied on the Government’s misrepresentation in
bidding on the subcontract. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1348–49. The court notes a number of difficulties with ITC’s passthrough theory, including “(1) whether a subcontractor pass-through claim can be
based on representations appearing in the prime contract and (2) whether the
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On this point, ITC alleged that ITC’s subcontractor, based on the
Government’s representations, “assumed that the contaminated soil
327
contain[ed] an overall clay content of less than 10% clay”. Because
the content of clay turned out to be much greater than ten percent,
328
ITC’s subcontractor incurred greater than expected costs.
Although, as the court explained, “[a] misstatement as to site
conditions in a government contract can support a claim for breach
of contract,” in order to be successful on such a claim, the contractor
329
At issue here are the first two
must establish four elements.
elements: First, that the “the contractor must prove that a reasonable
contractor reading the contract documents as a whole would
interpret them as making a representation as to the site conditions,”
and second, that “the contractor must prove that the actual site
conditions were not reasonably foreseeable to the contractor, with
the information available to the particular contractor outside the
contract documents, i.e., that the contractor ‘reasonably relied’ on
330
the representations.”
With regard to the first element, the court applied de novo review as
it involves “a matter of contract interpretation and thus presents a
331
question of law” and placed itself into the shoes of a reasonable and
prudent contractor. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that “a
reasonable contractor would [not] have read the contract as
representing that the soil would contain less than ten percent clay”
332
Turning to the second
based on the contract documents.
element—whether a contractor reasonably relied upon a
representation—the court found that the subcontractor “could not
have reasonably relied on any representation as to the clay content of
the soil because it knew that, due to flaws in the sampling
333
methodology,” it could not rely upon the methodology.
It is interesting to note that, in a footnote, the court expressed
skepticism that a breach requires a showing of Government
334
culpability as the ASBCA so noted.

Limitation of Cost clause limits the prime contractor’s ability to assert a pass-through
claim based on breach of the subcontract.” Id. at 1348.
327. Id. at 1348.
328. Id. at 1346.
329. Id. at 1348.
330. Id. at 1348–49.
331. Id. at 1350 (citing H.B. Mac, Inc. v. United States, 153 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted)).
332. Id. at 1352 n.6.
333. Id. at 1353.
334. Id. at 1349 n.5.
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336

CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States (CHE II) addresses the issue
of supplementation of the administrative record in a pre-award bid
337
protest. CHE Consulting (“CHE”) protested at the COFC the
decision of the United States Naval Oceanographic Office (“NAVO”)
to solicit a single provider for hardware and software maintenance of
338
a complex computer system.
The COFC, after requesting that
339
denied CHE’s
NAVO supplement the administrative record,
protest, finding that NAVO’s decision to solicit a single provider was
reasonable and did not violate the Competition in Contracting Act
340
(“CICA”). CHE subsequently appealed this decision to the Federal
Circuit contending that the COFC’s decision to require NAVO to
supplement the administrative record, and relying on that
supplemented record, violated the Administrative Procedure Act
341
(“APA”) and that NAVO’s single provider contract violates CICA.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) determined
that the unsupplemented administrative record was sufficient to
support NAVO’s position.
The court explained: “NAVO had
established a rational basis to combine hardware and software
maintenance services into one contract before the trial court
requested supplementation,” and thus “[t]he additions to the
342
administrative record were . . . not necessary.”
In response to
CHE’s contention that NAVO had an obligation to point to past
experiences to substantiate its concerns, the court pointed to the “full
and open competition” policy of CICA, and explained that “CICA
imposes no obligation to supply a historical record of failures in
335. No. 2007-5172, 2008 Fed. Cir. WL 5397566 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2008).
336. Id.
337. Prior to its COFC protest, CHE filed an agency level protest addressing the
same issue, which was denied on the basis that NAVO provided a reasonable basis for
its need to bundle services into a single contract. Id. at *2.
338. CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States (CHE I), 78 Fed. Cl. 380, 387–88 (Fed.
Cl. 2007), aff’d, CHE II, 2008 WL 539756, at *5. Previously, upon CHE’s request to
the General Services Administration (“GSA”), the entity administering the
procurement for NAVO, GSA had separated the maintenance contract into two
separate contracts—one contract for hardware and one contract for software. CHE
II, 2008 WL 539756 at *1. NAVO, however, rejected the separated contracts and
demanded a single provider for both software and hardware maintenance. Id.
339. Specifically, Judge Wheeler recommended that NAVO supplement the
administrative record with a cost analysis and market survey of other federal agencies
with the same availability requirements as NAVO, with similar finger-pointing
disputes over maintenance obligations as claimed by NAVO and the effect on the
competition and performance in those other agencies of separated solicitations.
CHE II, 2008 WL 539756, at *2.
340. CHE I, 78 Fed. Cl. at 387.
341. CHE II, 2008 WL 539756 at *1.
342. Id. at *3.
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order to substantiate a risk” and that, in fact, “NAVO has a
responsibility to assess risks and avoid them before they become a
343
Further, the court recognized “that agencies have
historical fact.”
discretion to use competitive procedures that are ‘best suited under
the circumstances of the procurement’ . . . [and that] NAVO need
not suffer some maintenance failures in order to substantiate its
assessment of risks or other potential ‘circumstances of the
344
procurement.’”
Because the court found that NAVO’s decision to procure a single
source was rational, it declined “to opine about the legal
consequences of NAVO’s supplementation of the administrative
345
record in light of APA requirements.”
VI. ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS
346

A. Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. United States
347

In Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
held that the United States may waive the prohibition in the Anti348
Assignment Act against the assignment of claims against the United
349
States and thereby validate an otherwise prohibited claim.
In this
case, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Government’s
recognition and written acceptance of a claim in the lower court
350
constituted a valid assignment.
This case arose out of the Federal Government’s program to
remove and dispose of spent nuclear waste created during the
351
operation of nuclear electric generating facilities. Delmarva Power
and Light (“Delmarva”) and Atlantic City Electricity Co. (“Atlantic
City”) (collectively the “Assignors”) owned minority undivided
interests in nuclear facilities owned and operated by PSEG Nuclear,
352
LLC and Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (collectively “PSEG”).
In 1999, the Assignors entered into Transfer Agreements with PSEG
agreeing to transfer their interest in the nuclear facilities for thirty
353
million dollars.
The agreements contained provisions which
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
542 F.3d 889 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id.
41 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
Delmarva Power, 542 F.3d at 893–94.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 891.
Id.
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transferred “‘[a]ll claims of Seller relating to or pertaining to the
Department of Energy’s defaults . . . including all claims for failure by
354
the Department of Energy to take Spent Nuclear Fuel.’”
In 2004, Delmarva and Atlantic City filed separate complaints in
the COFC seeking damages from the United States for the
Department of Energy’s breach of its contracts to begin the removal
of the nuclear waste from PSEG’s nuclear facilities, in which
355
Delmarva and Atlantic City had a minority interest. The Assignors
primarily argued that the Government’s breach of contract
constituted a taking of their former property interests, for which they
were entitled to just compensation, because the Government’s breach
of the removal contracts diminished the value of the nuclear plants,
and thus resulted in Delmarva and Atlantic City receiving less money
356
in the sale of their interest in the plants.
PSEG invoked the arbitration clause of the Transfer Agreements
and argued that the Assignor’s taking claims were assigned to
357
PSEG.
After arbitrators sustained PSEG’s contention, “[t]he
Assignors moved the Court of Federal Claims to vacate the arbitration
358
award.” The COFC subsequently asked the Government whether it
waived its rights under the Assignment of Claims Act, which
prompted the following response from the Government:
[T]he Government is exercising its sole discretion to accept the
assignments of those claims that the plaintiffs purported to make to
PSEG Nuclear, to the extent that we have been made aware of
those claims through the plaintiffs’ complaint in this action and
through the assignment provisions in the purchase and sale
agreements that have been included in the appendices to some of
359
the briefing in this case.

The COFC granted summary judgment for the Government and
dismissed the case, finding that the Government properly waived its
right under the Assignment of Claims Act to invalidate the
assignments, that the assignments included the takings claims and
that, having assigned its taking claims to PSEG, the Assignors had no
360
basis to assert their claims against the Government.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC, concluding
that the Government has the authority to waive the prohibition in the
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id. (alterations and omissions in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 892.
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Anti-Assignment Act on the assignment of claims and that it properly
361
In reviewing the language of the assignment
did so in this case.
clause in the Transfer Agreement, the Federal Circuit first concluded
that the takings claims fall within “‘claims . . . relating to or
pertaining to the Department of Energy’s defaults under the
Department of Energy Standard Contract’” and “‘claims for failure by
362
the Department of Energy to take Spent Nuclear Fuel.’”
Because
the taking claims are included in the assigned claims, the only issue is
363
whether the Anti-Assignment Act barred the assignments.
The Anti-Assignment Act consists of two statutory provisions that
broadly prohibit transfers of contracts involving the United States or
364
assignment of claims against the United States. Specifically, under
the first provision,
No contract . . . or any interest therein, shall be transferred by the
party to whom such contract . . . is given to any other party, and any
such transfer shall cause the annulment of the contract or order
365
transferred, so far as the United States is concerned.

Under the second provision, which is relevant to this case, an
“assignment of any part of a claim against the United States
Government or of an interest in the claim . . . may be made only after
a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant
366
Both provisions have
for payment of the claim has been issued.”
367
exceptions for assignments to “financing institution[s].”
Reviewing this statutory language relating to the assignment of
claims, the Federal Circuit concluded that this language includes
368
takings claims. Furthermore, claims in this case had been contested
by the Government, their amount was undecided, no warrant for
their payment was issued, and PSEG did not fall into the exception
369
Having found the Anti-Assignment Act
for financing institutions.
barred the assignment of the taking claims, the Federal Circuit
concluded that “[t]he only basis upon which the assignments could
be validated . . . is if the government validly waived” its application to
370
the takings claims.
361. Id. at 894.
362. Id. at 892 (omissions in original).
363. Id.
364. Id. (quoting Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. England, 313 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
365. Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 15(a)) (alteration and omissions in original).
366. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3727(a)(1), (b)) (omission in original).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 893.
369. Id.
370. Id.
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371

Relying on Tuftco Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
concluded that there was no valid reason why the Government should
not be able to waive the Anti-Assignment Act’s prohibition on the
assignment of claims and that, in this case, the Government properly
372
In Tuftco, the COFC “held that the government
waived its right.
validly waived the prohibitions against the assignment of government
contracts” because the contracting officer was fully aware of the
assignments of certain contracts to Tuftco, recognized the assignment
373
and communicated the recognition of the assignments. Using the
reasoning in Tuftco, the Federal Circuit found that the Government’s
written acceptance of claims in the COFC was a recognition of an
374
otherwise invalid assignment. Although the assignment of contracts
provision and the assignment of claims provision related to different
aspects of dealing with the Government, both provisions were for the
375
Accordingly, if the “government
protection of the Government.
conclude[d] that it [was] appropriate and in its best interest to
376
accept the assignment, it [could] do so.”
Such recognition and
377
acceptance of an assignment would make the assignment valid.
VII. DAMAGES
The next four cases are Winstar-related damage cases that the
378
Federal Circuit decided in 2008.
The Winstar line of cases arose
from the savings and loan crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, in
which Government regulators encouraged many healthy thrifts to
379
In exchange for
acquire one or more troubled or failing thrifts.
agreeing to acquire unhealthy thrifts, Government regulators entered
into contracts or “assistance agreements” with the acquirers that
generally permitted them to account for a “fictitious intangible asset”
on their books called “supervisory goodwill” that “‘reflected the
amount by which the assumed liabilities of the acquired thrifts
380
The acquiring
exceeded the value of the acquired assets.’”
institutions were allowed to count this asset towards its regulatory
371. 614 F.2d 740 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
372. Delmarva Power, 542 F.3d at 893.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 893–94.
376. Id. at 894.
377. Id.
378. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
379. Granite Mgmt. Corp. v. United States (Granite II), 511 F.3d 1360, 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
380. Id. (quoting Granite Mgmt. Corp. v. United States (Granite I), 416 F.3d 1373,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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reserve capital requirements and to amortize its value over a number
381
of years.
The enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
382
Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), prohibited the practice of
383
Without the
including supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital.
ability to account for supervisory goodwill toward their regulatory
capital requirements, many acquiring thrifts’ capital position
worsened, causing many to take action to maintain regulatory capital
384
compliance. In United States v. Winstar Corp., the Supreme Court
held that the enactment of FIRREA constituted a breach of the
assistance agreements, which promised supervisory goodwill
accounting as well as other forbearances, and that the Government
385
was liable for damages.
386

A. Granite Management Corp. v. United States

Granite Management Corporation (“Granite”) acquired four
387
unhealthy thrifts in 1986.
Granite consolidated these thrifts into
one thrift called First Nationwide Bank (“First Nationwide”), turned
it into a financially healthy institution, and then sold it to First
388
Granite brought suit in the COFC seeking
Madison in 1994.
damages for the Government’s breach of its assistance agreement
389
with Granite by the enactment of FIRREA. On appeal in 2005, the
Federal Circuit reversed in part the COFC’s decision to grant the
Government summary judgment and remanded the question of
“‘whether First Nationwide could have been sold for more if it had
390
included “supervisory goodwill”’” as an asset.
In answering this question, the COFC found that Granite failed to
prove that it could have sold First Nationwide for more than it did,
391
had it been allowed to transfer supervisory goodwill.
The COFC
relied on the language of the assistance agreements in finding
(1) that the agreements required Granite to obtain prior written
approval from federal regulators in order to transfer the terms and
381.
1376).
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Granite II, 511 F.3d at 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Granite I, 416 F.3d at
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
Granite II, 511 F.3d at 1361 (citing Granite I, 416 F.3d at 1377).
518 U.S. 839 (1996).
Id. at 910.
511 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1361–1362.
Id. at 1362.
Id. (quoting Granite I, 416 F.3d 1373, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Id.
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benefits of the assistance agreements, and (2) that federal regulators
would not have approved a transfer of supervisory goodwill in
392
The COFC
Granite’s sale of First Nationwide to First Madison.
determined that because the sale was between two financially healthy
institutions, such a transfer “would have been completely counter to
393
Thus, Granite failed to
the purpose of regulatory forbearances.”
prove its injury because, if regulators would have refused to allow
Granite to transfer its accounting of supervisory goodwill, then the
supervisory goodwill would have been worthless and would not have
affected the proceeds garnered in First Nationwide’s sale to First
394
Madison.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s reasoning and factual
findings and held that Granite failed to prove it suffered any
calculable damages and, therefore, did not address the additional
395
arguments considered by the COFC.
396

B. First Federal Lincoln Bank v. United States

In another Winstar-related case, First Federal Lincoln Bank v. United
397
States, the Federal Circuit held that the COFC erred by improperly
calculating damages based on lost deposits by calculating the amount
of losses as valued as of date of trial, rather than as of the date of the
398
breach.
In 1982, First Federal Lincoln Bank (“First Federal”) received
separate regulatory approval to acquire three financially troubled
thrifts, Great Plains Federal Savings and Loan Association of Falls
City, Nebraska (“Great Plains”), Tri-Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Wahoo, Nebraska (“Tri-Federal”), and First Federal
399
Savings and Loan Association of Norfolk, Nebraska (“Norfolk”). At
the time of FIRREA’s enactment, First Federal claimed “$29,977,465
400
of remaining goodwill from the three mergers combined.” Because
the enactment of FIRREA in 1989 barred the use of supervisory
goodwill to satisfy regulatory capital requirements, First Federal’s
capital position worsened, prompting criticism from federal

392. Id. at 1363.
393. Id. at 1362 (quoting Granite Mgmt. Corp. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 155,
162 (Fed. Cl. 2006)).
394. Granite II, 511 F.3d at 1363.
395. Id. at 1364–65.
396. 518 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 1322.
399. Id. at 1311.
400. Id. at 1313.
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401

In response to this
regulators regarding its financial health.
criticism and to improve its capital position, First Federal reduced its
business operations by shrinking its deposit base and closing several
402
Claiming that this contraction of its
branches from 1990-1993.
business resulted in lost profits and lost franchise value, First Federal
brought suit in the COFC for breach of contract by the enactment of
403
FIRREA.
In a first trial on liability, the COFC found that an assistance
agreement, permitting the accounting of supervisory goodwill,
existed only in relation to the Great Plains merger and not to the Tri404
Federal or Norfolk mergers.
In its trial on damages, First Federal
sought the value for lost profits and lost franchise value resulting
405
from the loss of actual deposits and loss of growth opportunities.
The COFC awarded damages for the value of the deposits lost from
1990–1993, but rejected First Federal’s claims for “lost profits and lost
406
deposit growth as speculative.” In calculating the damages for the
value of deposits First Federal lost during its period of contraction,
the COFC approximated the value of the lost deposits by using data
based on the market as of 2001, the year of the trial, instead as of the
407
date of the breach.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit accepted the COFC’s determination
regarding the Government’s breach and liability but overturned the
damages award, holding that damages should have been calculated
408
based on the value of the lost deposits when the breach occurred.
Because the breach occurred during 1990–1993 when the deposits
were lost, damages should have been calculated with data relevant to
409
that period rather than with data relevant to 2001.
The Federal Circuit stated that, with the general exception for
calculating expectancy damages, “‘the appropriate date for
410
calculation of damages is the date of the breach.’” Disagreeing with
First Federal, the Federal Circuit held that a claim to recover the
value of lost deposits was not a claim for expectancy damages and,

401. Id. at 1314. In particular, regulators criticized First Federal’s earning
performance, classified asset level, and level of its total assets. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1315.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1316.
409. Id.
410. Id. (quoting Energy Capital Corp. v. United States, 302 F.3d 1314, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
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Instead, the
therefore, the general exception did not apply.
Federal Circuit viewed the claim as one for lost “income-generating
property,” which is “properly determined as of the time the property
412
is lost (usually the time of the breach).”
In dissent, Judge Mayer disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
that the award of lost deposits associated with franchise value was
somehow distinguishable from a claim for “lost profits,” a type of
413
expectancy damages.
Judge Mayer considered “the difference
between the two types of awards as one of semantics, not substance”
and would have affirmed the trial court’s calculation of damages as of
the date of trial, rather than at the time of the breach, as reviewed for
414
clear error.
After finding error with the COFC’s calculation of damages, the
Federal Circuit then considered “whether First Federal is entitled to
415
recover lost franchise value at the date of the breach.” The Federal
Circuit answered this question in the negative, on the grounds that
First Federal neither made nor provided any evidentiary support for a
claim to recover the value of the lost deposits as of the time of the
416
breach. Because First Federal failed to seek damages based on the
date of the breach and failed to present evidence to determine
deposit values in the 1990-1993 period, the Federal Circuit reversed
the COFC’s award of damages, foreclosing any possible recovery by
First Federal. Judge Mayer’s dissent called this result “fundamentally
unjust,” especially considering that the “government’s liability for
417
breach of contract is undisputed.”
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in First Federal renders a harsh
conclusion for plaintiffs who, as the non-breaching party, were left
without any recovery. Practitioners may be well advised to and seek
multiple, alternative measures of damages, and to provide the court
with evidentiary support for various alternative damages models.
418

C. American Savings Bank v. United States

In a third Winstar-related case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
COFC’s award for damages and offsets in relation to voided Note

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. at 1316–17.
Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1324 (Mayer, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1324–25.
Id. at 1318 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1327.
519 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Forbearance, but reversed the COFC’s award of restitution damages
419
in relation to voided Warrant Forbearance.
In 1988, American Savings and Loan Association of Stockton,
California (“American Savings”) failed and was taken over by the
420
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”).
The
FSLIC approved a plan that permitted Robert Bass and his associated
investors (the “Bass Investors”), to divide American Savings into a
liquidating and operating thrift (“New West” and “New American,”
respectively) and to allow Keystone Holdings Partners, L.P., a
partnership formed by the Bass Investors, to use wholly-owned
421
entities to acquire American Savings.
To facilitate this complex
transaction, the Government made certain forbearances. Under the
transaction, New West issued an eight-billion-dollar note, guaranteed
by the FSLIC, to New American, which received Note Forbearance
from the FSLIC that excused New American from complying with the
regulatory requirement of supporting the note with a proportionate
422
amount of capital. In addition, the assistance agreement provided
that FSLIC would receive stock warrants from New American giving it
423
a thirty percent ownership interest.
In exchange for the stock
warrants, FSLIC granted New American a Warrant Forbearance that
reduced the amount of regulatory capital New American was
424
required to maintain to remain in capital compliance.
As the usual story-line in Winstar-related cases goes, the passage of
FIRREA in 1989 resulted in a breach by the Government of the
assistance agreement and the Note and Warrant Forbearances
425
became void. As a result, New American was forced to use existing
capital to support the eight-billion-dollar note to maintain capital
426
compliance.
Additionally, while the use of the Warrant
Forbearance was void, the FSLIC still received the benefit of the
warrants in 1996 when Washington Mutual acquired New American
427
In the New American acquisition, the
in a stock transaction.
Government received Washington Mutual stock, which it
428
subsequently sold, netting $651.7 million.
419. Id. at 1328.
420. Id. at 1318.
421. Id. at 1318–19.
422. Id. at 1319.
423. Id.
424. Id. (citing Am. Sav. Bank, F.A. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 6, 10 (Fed. Cl.
2004)).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 1322.
427. Id. at 1324 (citing Am. Sav., 62 Fed. Cl. at 15).
428. Id. (citing Am. Sav., 62 Fed. Cl. at 15).
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On the issue of liability, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s
findings both that a Winstar-type contract existed and was breached,
and that the “Material Change of Law” clause in the assistance
agreement was not a “general risk allocation” provision that
precluded a claim for damages relating to the Note and Warrant
429
The COFC awarded damages relating to the
Forbearances.
Government’s breach of its promise to grant note forbearance by
calculating the actual costs New American was forced to pay capital
providers in the form of interest and dividend payments for the preexisting assets used to meet the capital requirements, offset by the
430
benefit gained from holding those assets. The COFC also granted
restitution damages to plaintiffs based on its finding that the
assistance agreement’s Warrant Forbearance provision was divisible
431
from the rest of the contract.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s damages and
offset calculations. The Government argued that New American did
not suffer injuries because it would still have incurred the cost of
raising the same capital absent the breach, and that plaintiffs were
not entitled to damages since they used existing capital at the time of
432
the breach to satisfy the regulatory capital requirements. The court
rejected both of these arguments and relied on a prior decision,
433
Home Savings of America v. United States, to hold that the COFC was
correct in calculating New American’s damages as the costs paid to
capital providers necessary to maintain capital compliance after the
FIRREA voided the Note Forbearance promised by the assistance
434
In its reasoning, the Federal Circuit stated that,
agreement.
“[a]bsent the breach, this capital would have been available to
Plaintiffs for other profitable uses or for repayment to investors to
435
avoid the ongoing costs of maintaining the capital.” The court also
relied on Home Savings to affirm the method of calculation used to
determine the offset amount as the value of the benefits gained from
436
the “real assets used to meet regulatory capital requirements.”

429. Id. at 1321 (citing Am. Sav., 62 Fed. Cl. at 511, 513).
430. Id. at 1323 (citing Am. Sav. Bank, F.A. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 756, 761
(Fed. Cl. 2006)).
431. Id. at 1324 (citing Am. Sav., 62 Fed. Cl. at 16).
432. Id. at 1322.
433. 399 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding Government liable for breaching a
promise to plaintiff thrift by enactment of FIRREA).
434. Am. Sav., 519 F.3d at 1323.
435. Id.
436. Id. (citing Am. Sav. Bank, F.A. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 756, 761 (Fed. Cl.
2006)).

2009]

2008 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS

1099

On the issue of Warrant Forbearance, the Federal Circuit reversed
the decision of the COFC, disagreeing with the COFC’s finding that
the assistance agreement was divisible and held that an award for
437
partial restitution damages was not appropriate. At trial, the COFC
considered evidence suggesting that during negotiations of the
assistance agreement, plaintiffs made clear that the warrants would be
revocable upon the Government’s breach and, therefore, determined
that the issuance of stock warrants and the Warrant Forbearance was
438
On
an arrangement that could be “unwound” from the contract.
appeal, the Federal Circuit looked to both the language of the
assistance agreement and the negotiation history of the parties’, and
held that the parties did not intend for their agreement to be
439
divisible.
Without divisibility of contract, the award for partial
restitution was reversed, and the Federal Circuit remanded the case
to the COFC to determine if damages might be appropriate under an
440
alternative theory.
441

D. Fifth Third Bank v. United States
442

In Fifth Third Bank v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the COFC’s application of the criteria plaintiffs must meet to succeed
on a claim to recover expectancy damages, stating such findings
443
should be reviewed for clear error.
Citizens Bank (“Citizens”), which was acquired by Fifth Third Bank
(“Fifth Third”), agreed to acquire failing thrifts in six separate
444
In each of these
transactions between the years of 1982–1985.
acquisitions, Citizens entered into an assistance agreement with
federal regulators that permitted Citizens to account for supervisory
goodwill towards its minimum regulatory capital requirements and to
445
amortize it as an asset over a period of years. As with other Winstartype contract cases, the Government breached the assistance

437. Id. at 1325.
438. Id. (citing Am. Sav. Bank, F.A. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 6, 18 (Fed. Cl.
2004)).
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1328.
441. 518 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1377.
444. Fifth Third Bank v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 56, 63–64 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
445. Id. In a first appeal in this case, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC on
the issue of liability and held that the parties had formed a contractual relationship
and that the Government was liable for breach as a result of the enactment of
FIRREA. Fifth Third Bank of W. Ohio v. United States, 402 F.3d 1221, 1236–37 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
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With the
agreements with the passage of FIRREA in 1989.
elimination of this special accounting treatment, Citizens needed to
improve its capital position and sought to do so by selling its
Cincinnati branch in 1991 and converting from a mutual to a stock
447
company in 1992. Fifth Third, as successor to Citizens, brought this
suit asserting that but-for the Government’s breach, Citizens would
not have entered into these transactions until a later year when
448
market conditions improved. Fifth Third sought damages equal to
lost proceeds resulting from the forced sale of the Cincinnati branch,
as well as the loss of the branch’s operating profits from the time
Citizens was forced to sell the branch to the time when it would have
actually sold it, and for lost proceeds from the premature mutual to
449
stock company conversion.
At the conclusion of the damages trial, the COFC allowed Fifth
Third to recover the lost proceeds from the sale of the Cincinnati
450
branch and the lost proceeds from the premature conversion. The
COFC denied recovery of damages for lost operating profits from the
451
premature sale of the Cincinnati branch as too speculative.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the COFC findings based
on a clear error standard and affirmed the COFC’s ruling on liability
452
and damages. The Federal Circuit examined the COFC’s reasoning
with respect to its findings on each of the requirements for
recovering expectancy damages—foreseeability, causation, and
certainty in proof of damages—and found no clear error in any of
453
COFC’s findings.
With regard to causation, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the COFC’s conclusion that but-for the enactment of
FIRREA, Citizens’ decision to sell the Cincinnati branch and convert
454
from a mutual to stock company might not have occurred. On the
issue of foreseeability, the COFC’s finding that a prudent regulator
would or should have foreseen that the Government’s breach of the
assistance agreements would result in the acquiring thrift’s need to
raise additional capital and sustain other damages was without clear

446. The Court made note of the extensive litigation that has arisen as a result of
the Winstar decision in 1996 and stated that the Government’s brief reports that an
additional 26 Winstar-related cases remain pending. Fifth Third Bank, 518 F.3d at
1371 n.5.
447. Id. at 1372.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1374.
451. Id. at 1378.
452. Id. at 1375-78.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 1378.
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455

The court expressly rejected the Government’s argument
error.
that the damages from the conversion and sale were not foreseeable
at the time the parties entered into the contract because they could
not have known unfavorable market conditions would exist at the
time Citizens would undertake these actions in response to the
456
The court explained that to recover
Government’s breach.
expectancy damages, a showing that the Government could foresee
the type of likely response of the other party in the event of its own
breach was adequate to prove foreseeability; thus, the ability to
foresee the circumstances existing at the time of the breach that
457
might add to plaintiff’s damages is not required.
On the issue of
certainty of proof of damages with respect to the calculation of
damages caused by the premature conversion, the court rejected the
Government’s argument that “conversion proceeds are not a proper
458
The Federal Circuit held that
measure of expectancy damages.”
459
proceeds from a conversion can be recovered.
On cross-appeal, Fifth Third sought to recover the denied lost
operating profits from the premature sale of the Cincinnati branch.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the COFC’s finding that the
calculation of such profits were too speculative and that “it was not
reasonably certain that the Cincinnati assets would have earned
profits during the entire period in question” and that the COFC did
not err in “reject[ing] the notion that the bank’s expanded asset
base . . . would have realized profits at a rate similar to that of the
460
actual bank’s profits.”
461

E. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. United States

In this case, the Federal Circuit held that, when calculating
expectancy damages, the proper construction of a “no-breach
scenario” must represent what both parties anticipated they would
receive under their bargain at a time when both parties believed that
462
performance under the contract was possible.
In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
463
(“NWPA”) that, among other goals, sought to establish “federal
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Id. at 1375-1377.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id. at 1380.
Id. 1380–81.
Id. at 1379.
536 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1290–91.
Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983).
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responsibility” for the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel
(“SNF”) and high-nuclear level waste (“HLW”) and to establish a
fund subsidized by utility companies to pay for federal waste removal
464
and disposal. Pursuant to this Act, the United States Department of
Energy (“DOE”) was charged with taking title and disposing of the
SNF and HLW from the utility companies “‘as expeditiously as
practicable,’” but obligated to accept the waste no later than January
465
31, 1998. Pursuant to the NWPA, the DOE entered into a series of
standard contracts with the utility companies generating this waste.
The terms of the standard contracts required the utility companies to
pay a one-time fee to cover the fuel used to generate electricity prior
to April 7, 1983, and to commit to paying quarterly fees into DOE’s
466
Nuclear Waste Fund (the “NWF”).
The standard contracts,
however, did not set forth a firm rate at which the DOE would accept
and dispose of the SNF and HLW once it began its performance
467
Instead, the contract established a procedure
under the contract.
by which DOE would file two types of annual reports: one to project
the ability of DOE facilities to accept SNF and HLW, the other to
issue “annual acceptance priority rankings beginning April 1,
468
In turn, the standard contracts bound utility companies to
1991.”
file “a delivery commitment schedule to DOE to identify SNF/HLW
469
ready for delivery.”
In 1987 Congress enacted an amendment to the NWPA, through
which a new DOE directive, relating to waste repository construction,
essentially rendered the original mandate that DOE begin accepting
470
SNF and HLW by January of 1998 impossible. Upon the enactment
of this amendment, it was well recognized in the industry that the
Government would not be able to perform pursuant to the terms of
471
the standard contracts. The DOE also recognized this inevitability,
as its 1991 report made projections for waste acceptance contingent
472
on the repeal of certain provisions of the 1987 NWPA Amendment.
In 1998, the Government breached the standard contracts by
473
failing to begin accepting title and disposing of SNF and HLW. In
464. Pac. Gas & Elec., 536 F.3d at 1285.
465. Id. (quoting Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C.A. § 10222(a)(5)(A)
(2006)).
466. Id. at 1284.
467. Id. at 1285.
468. Id. at 1286.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 1287.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 1290.
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fact, at the time of the decision, the Government still had not begun
to perform under the contract, while many utility companies have
continued to pay into the NWF, as well as pay for storage costs for the
474
nuclear waste still remaining in their possession. The Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (“PG&E”), as well as numerous other utility
companies, filed an action in the COFC, seeking to recover damages
475
based on the Government’s partial breach of the standard contract.
After holding that the Government was liable for a partial breach
of the standard contract, the COFC ran into the problem of
calculating the proper measure of PG&E’s damages because of the
absence of a firm rate of acceptance at which the DOE would have
begun accepting SNF/HLW had a breach not occurred. An essential
term of the contract, the COFC properly looked to the annual
reports the DOE issued as part of the acceptance schedule process to
discern how much and how quickly PG&E would have been able to
476
unload its stored waste beginning in January of 1998.
The COFC
decided to use the numbers contained in the 1991 DOE report to
477
determine the likely acceptance rate had DOE performed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the COFC’s use of
the 1991 numbers to calculate damages, holding that in constructing
what Government performance would have been in a non-breach
scenario, the court should have applied the rate of acceptance that
was projected at a time when both parties still believed that
478
The court
performance under the contract was still possible.
reasoned that because the COFC had found that both parties
recognized that the 1987 NWPA Amendment had the effect of
making the Government’s performance under the contract
impossible, subsequent reports were “tainted by the impending
479
breach.” Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the 1987 report—the
last report filed before the Government’s breach was believed to be
inevitable—was the “most reasonable measure of the contractual
480
acceptance rate.”
474. Id. at 1284.
475. Id. at 1287; see also Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272,
1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (establishing that DOE breached its “statutory obligation” by
not performing by the January 31, 1998 deadline).
476. Pac. Gas & Elec., 536 F.3d at 1288.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 1292.
479. Id.
480. Id. The Federal Circuit affirmed and reversed two other issues on appeal—
COFC’s ruling on the exclusion of Greater Than Class C waste from the Standard
Contract and on the denial to grant plaintiff’s motion based on the COFC Rule
54(b)—for reasons set forth in the companion case Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United
States (Yankee Atomic II), 536 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States

In the companion case to Pacific Gas, the Federal Circuit squarely
established that, while a trial court may apply the “substantial factor”
test to establish causation in SNF/HLW cases, a plausible “but-for”
482
world must still be established to calculate expectancy damages.
While the Pacific Gas court erred by applying the wrong projected
numbers to calculate the DOE’s waste acceptance rate had it
performed under the terms of the contract, the Federal Circuit held
483
in Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States that the COFC erred by
failing to establish causation by failing to apply any DOE acceptance
484
The Federal Circuit held that the
rate of SNF and HLW at all.
COFC’s finding of what the DOE’s waste acceptance rate would have
been was based on “assumption and approximation [and was] not
enough to support a finding of causation under the substantial factor
485
test.”
In remanding the case, the Federal Circuit directed the
COFC to apply the acceptance rate identified in the Pacific Gas
486
These companion
decision to determine causation and damages.
cases are important in that the Federal Circuit has established that
the projected waste acceptance rate contained in the 1987 DOE
report as the standard by which plaintiffs can readily use to calculate
damages in similar actions asserting a breach of the standard
contract. In this decision, the Federal Circuit opts for uniformity,
rather than approaching subsequent cases relating to the
Government’s breach on a case-by-case basis.
The Federal Circuit also considered three additional questions.
First, it considered the COFC’s decision to award two of the plaintiffs,
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (“Maine Yankee”) and
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (“Connecticut Yankee”)
(collectively, “the Yankees”), damages based on their pre-breach
481. 536 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
482. Id. at 1272–73. The Federal Circuit noted that the substantial factor test has
also been applied in Winstar cases pursuant to their ruling in Citizens Fed. Bank v.
United States, 474 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007), which the Honorable Mary Ellen Coster
Williams noted in last year’s summary of Federal Circuit government contract
decisions. Mary Ellen Coster Williams, 2007 Government Contract Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1114 (2008). In the instant case, the Federal Circuit
restated that damages are recoverable under the substantial factor test if “‘(1) the
damages were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party at the time of
contracting; (2) the breach is a substantial causal factor in the damages; and (3) the
damages are shown with reasonable certainty.’” Yankee Atomic II, 536 F.3d at 1273
(citing Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005))
(emphasis omitted).
483. 536 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
484. Id. at 1273–74.
485. Id.
486. Id.

2009]

2008 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS

1105

487

efforts of “reracking.” Both Maine Yankee and Connecticut Yankee
chose to rerack their wet pools in 1993 and 1995, respectively, more
488
On appeal, the
than four years before the Government’s breach.
Federal Circuit considered the record replete with support that the
plaintiffs undertook this action believing that the Government was
going to commit a breach and that this process, which increases SNF
storage capacity, was a “commercially reasonable” decision and
489
“foreseeable” to the DOE.
Thus, in deferring to the COFC’s
election to apply the substantial factor test, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the COFC finding as to foreseeability and remanded the
question of “whether the Government’s partial breach of contract was
490
a substantial factor in causing the Yankees to rerack.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered two other issues which,
as incorporated by reference, applied as a holding in Pacific Gas as
well. First, the Federal Circuit upheld COFC’s finding that the
standard contract included Greater Than Class C (“GTCC”) waste
and, therefore, the plaintiffs may recover storage expenses for this
491
GTCC waste is a radioactive byproduct of nuclear
type of waste.
power generation, but not explicitly referred to in the standard
492
contracts.
By affirming GTCC inclusion in the standard contract,
the Federal Circuit allowed the Yankees to seek damages on their
storage costs of GTCC waste. Secondly, on cross-appeal by the
Yankees, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC decision to deny the
Yankees’ motion to enter a partial judgment and retain jurisdiction
493
over their claims for future damages, under COFC Rule 54(b). The
Federal Circuit held that “[t]he Court of Federal Claims did not have
494
jurisdiction to consider the Yankees’ demand for future damages.”
495

G. Amber Natural Resources v. United States

In Amber Natural Resources v. United States, the Federal Circuit held
that a statutory breach of a contract constituted repudiation by the
Government and allowed the non-breaching party to recover on a
496
claim for restitution.
487. Id. (citing Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States (Yankee Atomic I), 73 Fed.
Cl. 249, 326 (Fed. Cl. 2006)).
488. Id. at 1275.
489. Id. at 1276 (quoting Yankee Atomic I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 279, 283).
490. Yankee Atomic II, 536 F.3d at 1276–77.
491. Id. at 1278–79.
492. Id. at 1277.
493. Id. at 1282.
494. Id.
495. 538 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
496. Id.
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Pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary of the Interior
497
by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (“OCSLA”),
numerous leases were granted to private entities from the 1960s
through the 1980s to explore, develop and extract oil and gas
498
resources in the outer continental shelf. The leases were usually for
a period of five years, but could be extended by the grant of a
“suspension” authorized by the Department of the Interior (the
499
“Department”).
These suspensions were important because they
allowed lessees to extend the term of their lease and continue their
500
exploratory efforts. In consideration for these leases, the plaintiffs
501
collectively paid $1.1 billion dollars to the Government.
In 1972, Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act
502
(“CZMA”),
which encouraged states “to develop coastal
management plans” that, once adopted, required federal agencies
conducting activities affecting coastal zones to act in accordance with
the state plans, as judged by the states themselves through a review
503
Initially, the Department did not
and certification process.
consider the sale of leases to be an activity within the statute’s scope,
and that interpretation was upheld in a Supreme Court decision in
504
1984.
In response, Congress amended the CZMA in 1990 (the
“1990 CZMA Amendments”), which brought the sale of leases within
the scope of the statute and established more lengthy and
burdensome procedures for federal agencies to follow to obtain
approval of their coastal activities, which ultimately gave the states
greater ability to halt certain activities and make them more
505
expensive to pursue.
While the 1990 CZMA Amendments made it clear that the
Department’s sale of leases fell within the scope of the CZMA, the
Department and lessees still was believed that the activity of granting
506
The State of California challenged
suspensions did not.
suspensions granted in 1999, asserting that the suspensions did not
conform to the procedures established in the 1990 CZMA
497. Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953).
498. Amber, 538 F.3d at 1362. The outer continental shelf is defined by the Court
as “including all submerged land that is beyond the outer limits of state
jurisdiction . . . and within the limits of national jurisdiction.” Id.
499. Id. at 1362.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 1367.
502. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972).
503. Amber, 538 F.3d at 1363 (citing 16. U.S.C. § 1452 (2006)).
504. Id. at 1364. The Supreme Court held that the CZMA did not apply to the sale
of leases in Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
505. Amber, 538 F.3d at 1364.
506. Id. at 1364-65.
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507

Thus, the Department was forced to revoke the
Amendments.
508
suspensions pursuant to the decision in California v. Norton, which
held that the 1990 CZMA Amendments applied to suspension
509
activity.
In 2002, the lessees filed suit in the COFC, asserting that the
1990 CZMA Amendments breached their lease agreements, and
sought rescission of their contracts, restitution, and recovery of the
510
sunk costs expended to exploit their leases as damages. The COFC
held that the Government was indeed liable, finding that the
1990 CZMA Amendments “constituted an anticipatory repudiation of
the lease agreements” and granted the lessees restitution damages in
the amount of $1.1 billion dollars—the amount the lessees had paid
511
for their leases—but denied any recovery for sunk costs. The COFC
found the Government liable because the 1990 CZMA Amendments
clearly contradicted the terms of section 1 of the leases, which
specified the procedures the Department would follow in approving
or granting discretionary lease suspensions and also incorporated by
reference the statutes and regulations in existence at the time of the
leases’ execution, by imposing different procedures and regulations
512
upon their agreements. Thus, the COFC found that the new
procedures and regulations imposed by the 1990 CZMA
Amendments constituted an anticipatory repudiation by the
513
Government of the lease agreements.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s award of
restitution damages and its finding of liability, relying in large part on
the reasoning in Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v.
514
515
United States, which involved similar leases with similar provisions.
However, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the COFC’s finding that
the 1990 CZMA Amendments themselves constituted a breach or
repudiation at the time of its enactment, recognizing that neither the
Government nor the lessees believed the 1990 CZMA Amendments
applied to the activity of granting suspensions and, therefore, at the
time of its enactment, neither party considered there to exist a

507. Id. at 1365.
508. 150 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
509. Amber, 538 F.3d at 1365.
510. Id. at 1366.
511. Id. at 1366–67.
512. Id. at 1369.
513. Id.
514. 530 U.S. 604 (2000) (reversing Federal Circuit reversal of COFC decision
awarding restitution to oil companies for payments on oil lease contracts).
515. Amber, 538 F.3d at 1368.
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Instead, the Federal Circuit concluded that only after the
breach.
Norton decision in 2001 did the Government begin to repudiate the
lease agreements by following the ruling of that case and applying the
1990 CZMA Amendments to the activity of granting lease
517
Notwithstanding this disagreement, the Federal
suspensions.
Circuit affirmed the COFC’s award for restitution damages on the
ground that restitution is an appropriate remedy for repudiation of a
518
contract.
The court rejected the Government’s argument that
restitution of the entire amount paid for the leases is improper where
the plaintiffs were purchasers of the leases from the original
519
leaseholders, as many leases were bought at a discount.
The
Federal Circuit held that restitution in the amount of the original
payment to obtain the leases was not a “windfall” to plaintiffs and was
recoverable based on the new leaseholder’s contractual right to
520
“stand in the shoes” of the original leaseholders.
The Government put forth numerous arguments questioning its
liability and the extent and existence of plaintiffs’ alleged injuries,
based largely on the argument that the lessees had no “clear,
unqualified right” to be granted requested suspensions at all, as they
521
were always discretionary.
The Federal Circuit rejected the
Government’s arguments, holding that while the lessees might not
have had a clear right to a suspension, they did bargain for a set of
procedures and standards that would that would govern the
Department’s decision to grant or deny lease suspensions, and the
leases contained a guarantee that future statutes or regulations would
522
not alter those agreed upon procedures.
The Government also
made various arguments based mostly on causation and waiver, each
523
of which the court rejected.
On cross-appeal, plaintiffs urged the Federal Circuit to award them
restitution based on the amount of “benefit” the Government
received as a result of the plaintiffs’ efforts under the terms of the
leases, measured by the sunk costs expended by plaintiffs to so
524
Plaintiffs argued that they were required to take actions
perform.
to explore and develop the natural resources and that, if successful,

516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1371-72.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1379.
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The
the Government would receive royalties on their profits.
Federal Circuit refused to award restitution according to this measure
because of the “inherently uncertain nature of calculating the benefit
526
conferred by the lessees’ due diligence activities.”
VIII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES/EAJA
527

A. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States
528

In Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, a
contractor appealed the decision of the COFC to dismiss as untimely
the contractor’s application for fees and expenses pursuant to the
529
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). The fees and expenses sought
by Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi (“Impresa”)
stemmed from a bid protest filed in 1999 in the COFC challenging
530
the award of a contract by the Department of the Navy. Although
531
the COFC denied Impresa’s protest, this decision was reversed on
532
appeal by the Federal Circuit. On remand, the COFC granted the
protest but denied Impresa’s claim for bid preparation and proposal
533
costs. Impresa filed an appeal of the court’s denial to the Federal
Circuit, but subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the appeal and
issue final judgment in favor of the Government. On March 11,
2005, the Federal Circuit granted Impresa’s motion, issuing the
534
mandate on that same date.
On July 5, 2005, Impresa filed in the COFC an EAJA Application
for Fees and Other Expenses relating to its successful bid protest.
Ultimately, the court held that Impresa’s EAJA application was
untimely because it occurred more than thirty days after the Federal
535
Circuit’s final judgment on March 11, 2005. Specifically, the court
525. Id. at 1380.
526. Id. at 1381.
527. 531 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
528. Id.
529. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
530. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States (Impresa V),
73 Fed. Cl. 718, 719 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
531. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States (Impresa I),
44 Fed. Cl. 540, 556 (1999).
532. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States (Impresa II),
238 F.3d 1324, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
533. Impresa Construzoni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States (Impresa III),
61 Fed. Cl. 175, 184 (2004).
534. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States (Impresa IV),
125 Fed. App’x 310 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
535. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States (Impresa VI),
531 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Initially, the COFC rejected Impresa’s July 5,
2005 EAJA application as premature under the “mistaken belief that a final judgment

1110

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1051

held that since Impresa had voluntarily requested dismissal of its
appeal, that judgment was final and not appealable as of its issue
536
date. Impresa appealed the court’s decision.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in response to Impresa’s appeal
addressed the issue of when a voluntary dismissal becomes a “final
judgment” for purposes of the EAJA. The court began by explaining
that in accordance with the EAJA, “a party that prevails against the
United States in a civil action may recover attorney fees and expenses
537
if certain criteria are met,” but that to be timely under the EAJA, a
party must submit an application “‘within thirty days of final
538
judgment in the action.’” The EAJA defines “final judgment” as “a
539
The Government
judgment that is final and not appealable.”
specifically noted that it would be highly unlikely that the Supreme
Court would grant a certiorari petition for a case, such as this, where
the appeal in the circuit court had been dismissed without
540
prosecution.
Accordingly, novel in this case is the court’s
assessment of whether a single rule should apply when calculating
EAJA time or whether a case-by-case determination is required when
judgment arises from voluntary dismissal.
The Federal Circuit looked first to a United States Supreme Court
541
decision, Melkonyan v. Sullivan, which addressed “[t]he question of
542
finality for EAJA purposes.”
There, although the Court ruled that
“the filing period under the EAJA starts to accrue only after the time
to appeal has expired for all parties,” it did not address “the
543
circumstance of a final judgment entered on voluntary dismissal.”
Next, because the Federal Rules do not address “whether a final
judgment entered on an unopposed motion for dismissal is
544
amendable to appeal,” the court turned to consideration of how
this issue has been handled by different circuit courts.
The Federal Circuit’s survey of the circuits revealed that, in
general, the circuits have found that a single rule should apply in
calculating EAJA time periods regardless of whether an appeal is

had not yet issued.” Impresa V, 73 Fed. Cl. at 719. The court remedied this error
when Impresa filed a motion to resubmit its EAJA application by deeming the
application filed on July 5, 2005.
536. Id. at 721–22.
537. Impresa VI, 531 F.3d at 1369.
538. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2006)).
539. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G).
540. Impresa VI, 531 F.3d at 1371.
541. 501 U.S. 89 (1991).
542. Impresa VI, 531 F.3d at 1369 (citing Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 89).
543. Id. (citing Melkoynan, 501 U.S. at 89).
544. Id.
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545

likely to be filed. Although two of the circuits have instead adopted
a “functional approach” to this issue, which requires consideration by
the court of whether an appeal could have been taken by either party
546
on a case by case basis, the court ultimately found that:
Precedent weighs against creating a special category for voluntary
dismissals in cases originating in the Court of Federal Claims,
whereby it would be necessary to determine whether a petition for
certiorari can be filed or might be granted, in order to calculate
547
the period for filing an application under the EAJA.

The court also explained that “the better procedure is to avoid
preliminary litigation of time periods for EAJA filings when there has
been a voluntary dismissal, at least where the order of dismissal does
not specifically prohibit appeal,” reasoning that a case-by-case
determination of the time for filing an EAJA petition when a
judgment arises from voluntary dismissal, “would contravene the
purpose of the 1985 amendments to ‘give both courts and litigants
clear guidance on what is expected and avoid the unnecessary
548
confusion which accompanied this issue in the past.’”
Finally, the
court explained that “[t]he issue before us is not whether the
[Supreme] Court might grant certiorari if Impresa had filed such a
petition; the issue is whether the 30-day EAJA period will start and
end during the [ninety] days available for Impresa to request
549
As such, the court adopted “a uniform rule for EAJA
certiorari.”
petitions in the Court of Federal Claims, whereby appeal rights from
voluntary dismissals are presumed unless expressly disclaimed or
550
specifically prohibited.” Accordingly, the court reversed the COFC
decision that Impresa’s EAJA application was untimely and remanded
551
it back to the lower Court for a determination on the merits.
545. Id. at 1369–70 (citing Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600 (9th Cir.
2007), Adams v. SEC, 287 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and Scafar Contracting, Inc. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 325 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2003)).
546. Id. at 1370–71 (citing Briseno v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2002) and
Bryan v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 165 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 1999)).
547. Id. at 1371-72.
548. Id. at 1371 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-120 at 7 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 135, which stressed that the time for filing an EAJA fee application
should not be a “trap for the unwary resulting in the unwarranted denial of fees”).
549. Id.
550. Id. at 1372.
551. Circuit Judge Rader dissented stating:
In this case, Impresa moved without opposition to voluntarily dismiss its
appeal. Our court issued the mandate—by all measures a final judgment
because it covered the entire case and all issues. The grant of the voluntary
dismissal ended the litigation with a judgment that is “final and not
appealable.”
Id. (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1991)).
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IX. ATTORNEY SANCTIONS
552

A. 1-10 Industry Associates, LLC v. United States
553

In 1-10 Industry Associates, LLC, v. United States, a United States
Postal Service (“USPS”) attorney, Mr. Michael F. Kiely, appealed from
an order issued by the COFC imposing the sanction of reprimand
for: (1) a representation that the Government made in its brief that
the COFC perceived to be erroneous, and (2) an episode involving
554
The
Mr. Kiely’s appearance before the COFC in a previous case.
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the COFC’s order finding
that Mr. Kiely had breached the duty of candor because the
Government, in its brief, had made no affirmative representation as
to when it first knew of the basis for a counterclaim and, in any event,
“the court was aware of the uncontested facts showing that the
contracting officer was not the first person in the government to
know of the surcharges” that served at the basis of the Government’s
555
The Federal Circuit also concluded that the COFC
counterclaim.
abused its discretion by failing to give Mr. Kiely proper notice that his
556
alleged misconduct would be considered sanctionable conduct.
Within a month of filing the Government’s answer, Mr. Kiely met
with counsel for 1-10 Industry Associates, LLC (“1-10”) in November
557
2004, to discuss a possible settlement of the case.
During the
course of that conversation, Mr. Kiely learned that it was 1-10’s
practice to add a fifteen percent charge to each electric bill and, thus,
“the Government might have a counterclaim to recoup surcharges
558
However, Mr. Kiely believed it was
previously collected by 1-10.”
necessary to establish independently that 1-10 imposed a surcharge
upon the Government’s purchase of electricity in order to assert a
counterclaim to collect the surcharges 1-10 assessed the
559
In November 2005, Mr. Kiely deposed two of 1-10’s
Government.
officials, one of whom admitted that 1-10 added a fifteen-percent
552. 528 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
553. Id. The underlying dispute between the USPS and 1-10 Industry Associates,
LLC (“1-10”) concerns a lease in which the USPS agreed to pay for electricity
supplied by 1-10 to USPS in connection with the space USPS leased from 1-10. Id. at
861. The parties disagreed about the amounts due to 1-10, and 1-10 filed suit in the
COFC seeking $56,818.18 in unpaid electrical charges. Id. USPS’s answer to the
complaint consisted of a general denial. Id.
554. Id. at 866.
555. Id. at 870.
556. Id. at 861, 869.
557. Id. at 861.
558. Id. at 861–62.
559. Id. at 862.
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In February 2006,
surcharge to electricity bills sent to the USPS.
Mr. Kiely met with the contracting officer to discuss the possibility of
561
asserting a counterclaim regarding the surcharges. The contracting
officer denied any knowledge of such surcharges, but, after reviewing
the file on the lease, the contracting officer issued a demand letter to
562
1-10 seeking recoupment of the previous surcharges. Following the
contracting officer’s issuance of his demand letter, on May 5, 2006,
the Government filed a counterclaim in the amount of $106,076.14
563
for surcharges on electricity bills since 1990.
In June 2006, 1-10 moved to dismiss the Government’s
564
counterclaim. 1-10 characterized the counterclaim as a compulsory
counterclaim, which under Court of Federal Claims Rule 13(a)
565
(“RCFC”), was required to be filed at the time of the answer.
Moreover, it argued that the counterclaim was untimely because the
Government had “known of the surcharges for at least ten years,
based upon copies of authorized payments of electricity invoices from
566
1996 showing ‘+15%’ on their face.”
The Government’s response, signed by Mr. Kiely, did not dispute 1567
10’s timeliness arguments. Rather, it contended that the propriety
of its counterclaim should be measured under RCFC 13(e), “which
provides that the court ‘may permit a party to amend a pleading to
file a supplemental pleading asserting a counterclaim that matured
568
or was acquired by the party after serving an earlier pleading.’” The
Government asserted that, for the purposes of RCFC 13(e), the
counterclaim did not “mature” until the contracting officer issued his
final decision; so, the Government argued that the one-month lapse
of time between the contracting officer’s decision and the filing of
569
the counterclaim should not disqualify it under RCFC 13(e). In the
course of describing the contracting officer’s final decision, the
Government’s brief asserted that “‘the contracting officer has stated
570
No
that he was not aware of the claim until February of 2006.’”
mention was made of Mr. Kiely’s first learning in November 2004 of
the possible grounds for a counterclaim until the time that Mr. Kiely
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862–63.
Id. at 863.
Id.
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informed the contracting officer of the surcharges in the spring of
571
2006.
The COFC conducted a telephonic hearing on 1-10’s motion to
572
dismiss on November 13, 2006. The court announced that it would
dismiss the Government’s counterclaim because it was compulsory
573
and, as such, was untimely filed. It concluded further that some of
the statements Mr. Kiely made during the hearing raised the question
574
of whether sanctions were appropriate.
On November 17, 2006, the COFC issued an order directing Mr.
Kiely to show cause “why he should not be sanctioned under RCFC
575
11(c) ‘for making misrepresentations to the court.’” The court
noted that the Government’s statement that the contracting officer’s
failure to mention the 1996 bill showing “+15%,” or the November
2005 deposition testimony of 1-10’s employee who explained the
regular practice of the fifteen-percent surcharge “‘left [the Court]
with the impression that the Government officials did not know about
576
the counterclaim until sometime shortly before February of 2006.’”
Mr. Kiely responded to each of the factual items in the court’s show
577
cause order as the basis for its charge that he misled the court. Mr.
Kiely argued that he should not be sanctioned for the omission of
facts the Government deemed not necessary or relevant to his theory
of the case and that, since the court was itself aware of the
Government’s knowledge of the basis for a counterclaim before the
supposedly misleading reference to February of 2006, he should not
be sanctioned for the failure to mention facts he considered to be
irrelevant to the Government’s case when the court already had such
578
information.
On March 17, 2007, the COFC imposed the sanction of reprimand
579
The COFC ruled that Mr. Kiely had made
upon Mr. Kiely.
misrepresentations concerning the counterclaim by omitting facts
from its opposition to the motion to dismiss relating to when the
580
Government first learned of its counterclaim.
The court further
determined that the timing of when USPS first became aware of the
surcharge issue was highly relevant not only to when the claim first
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.

Id. at 862, 863.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 864.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 865.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 866.
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matured under RCFC 13(e) but also to whether the Government
“‘had failed to set up the counterclaim “through oversight,
581
inadvertence, or excusable neglect” under RCFC 13(f).’”
Relying upon the advisory committee notes to RCFC 11, the court
pointed out that it was obligated to consider circumstances in which
the person in question had engaged in similar conduct in other
582
The COFC referred to an incident in a prior case in
litigation.
which Mr. Kiely had been involved while employed as an attorney at
the Department of Justice, and where Mr. Kiely sought to introduce
583
The
at trial a document that had not previously been identified.
court expressed dissatisfaction with the affidavit filed by Mr. Kiely in
584
In acknowledging that the show
connection with that incident.
cause order had not mentioned the previous incident, the COFC
stated that “‘the court does not read RCFC 11(c)(1)(B) as requiring
it to describe in its order every factor that might impact its decision to
585
impose sanctions.’”
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Kiely contended that the
COFC violated the due process provisions found in RCFC
11(c)(1)(B) that require the court to give notice of “‘the specific
conduct that appears to violate subsection (b),’” in order to permit
the party an opportunity to show cause why no sanction for the
586
conduct is warranted.
The Federal Circuit noted that it had
reviewed the complete trial transcripts in the earlier case and that, on
May 7, 2003, the date that Mr. Kiely’s allegedly questionable conduct
587
occurred, the COFC had not referenced RCFC 11 or directly
indicated to Mr. Kiely that his conduct might be subject to sanctions
588
under that rule. Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that, on June
12, 2003, when the COFC returned to the issue of Exhibit 23, the
plaintiff conceded that the document had not been subject to a
previous discovery request, the court granted the Government’s
motion to have the document introduced as rebuttal evidence, and
589
the COFC expressed its appreciation of both parties’ conduct.
Based upon this analysis, the Federal Circuit concluded that, as of the
close of the record in the earlier case, “Mr. Kiely had no reason to
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 866.
584. Id. at 867.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Mr. Kiely sought to introduce a daily report document (Exhibit 23) as
rebuttal evidence. Id. at 868.
588. Id.
589. Id.
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think that he had engaged in possibly sanctionable conduct.” Thus,
the Federal Circuit concluded that the COFC’s failure to provide Mr.
Kiely with notice that his prior conduct provided evidence of a
591
pattern of misconduct was reversible error.
The Federal Circuit applied the objective test of “‘reasonableness
592
to conclude that the COFC’s
under the circumstances’”
determination that Mr. Kiely breached his duty of candor was
593
erroneous.
Importantly, the Federal Circuit noted that context
594
595
It specifically referred to Young v. City of Providence,
in
matters.
which “the court held that counsel could not be charged with
misrepresenting a fact to the court when the court itself knew the
true facts and thus could not have been misled by the less-than-clear
596
assertions by the party subject to the sanctions order.” The Federal
Circuit concluded that, on the Government’s theory of the case, the
counterclaim had not matured for jurisdictional purposes until the
contracting officer issued its final decision asserting the
597
Thus, the Government did not
Government’s counterclaim.
unreasonably delay in filing its counterclaim when it did so one
598
month after the contracting officer issued his final decision.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the Government may have
been misguided in its legal theory, but Mr. Kiely had made no
affirmative misrepresentation as to when the Government first knew
of the basis for a counterclaim, and “the court was aware of the
uncontested facts showing that the contracting officer was not the
599
first person in the government to know of the surcharges.”
The
Federal Circuit ruled that a neutral reading of the Government’s
opposition motion to dismiss in the context of the motion itself
revealed that the COFC erred when it read into Mr. Kiely’s response
an assertion that the contracting officer was the first person in the
Government to know of the surcharges because the court knew
600
otherwise. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded

590. Id.
591. Id. at 869.
592. Id. (citing White v. Gen. Motors Corp., Inc., 908 F.2d 675, 680 (10th Cir.
1990)).
593. Id.
594. Id. at 870.
595. 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005).
596. 1-10 Industry, 528 F.3d at 869, (citing Young, 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005)).
597. Id. at 870.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id.
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the COFC’s decision, with instructions to erase the sanctions against
601
Mr. Kiely.

601. Id.

